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J&K EARTHQUAKE

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Editor's Page

The year 2005 was marked by several natural disasters- droughts, floods, hurricanes like *Katrina* and *Rita* in the United States and the October earthquake in South Asia. A devastating earthquake of magnitude 7.6 struck Pakistan, India and Afghanistan on 8 October 2005 at 8.50 am (local time) with epicentre near Muzaffarabad, about 130 kms. from Islamabad. The high intensity earthquake caused massive destruction in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK). Other affected areas were North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) and northern Punjab in Pakistan and Poonch, Baramulla and Kupwara district of Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. According to Pakistan government sources, over 73, 000 people died, equal number were seriously injured and about 3 million affected in this catastrophe. In Jammu and Kashmir, about 1,300 persons died, 6,500 persons were injured and about 150, 000 people were rendered homeless by this earthquake, mostly in Uri, Tangdhar and Poonch.

Indian response to the earthquake was prompt and appropriate. Whereas the government was quick to release over six billion rupees towards relief, rehabilitation and compensation for dead, injured and loss of property, Indian civil society, NGOs and the corporate sector came forward by sending volunteers, relief materials and funds. Indian army launched Operation *Imdad* (help) establishing communication and transport links with remote and inaccessible villages, erecting makeshift bridges, providing tents and healthcare, organizing community kitchens and deploying helicopters and cargo planes in large numbers to ferry the injured and relief supplies. Besides, Indian army, Air Force and paramilitary forces adopted several villages devastated by the earthquake to rebuild them as model villages. J & K High Court even set up Lok Adalats to help quake survivors in inaccessible villages in Uri and Tangdhar. Over 20,000 quake related cases were settled by the Lok Adalats in 34 days, granting 250 million rupees to the survivors, which would have taken 22 years in the normal course. (*Indian Express*, 28 December 2005)

Though Pakistan did not respond favourably to the Indian offer of helicopters and also for joint relief and rescue operations, yet the Indian government took bold step of opening the LOC at five points: Tangdhar-Tithwal, Uri-Chakoti, Uri-Hajipir, Poonch-Rawlakot and Mendhar-Tattapani. India sent 25 truckloads of relief materials including tents, blankets, medicines and food stuffs across the LOC. BSNL, the Indian telecom company provided free telephone services to the people of Jammu and Kashmir to contact their counterparts across the LOC. Prime Minister of POK, Sardar Sikandar Hayat Khan, in an interview to *The Hindu* correspondent, expressed his willingness to buy goods from India for the reconstruction of quake-affected areas of POK. He said, "The factor of geography dictated that the relief could have been provided easily from the Indian side of Jammu and Kashmir. For instance, after the quake it took us 27 days to fully open the road to Neelum valley and rush our supplies. This could have been done in 40 to 45 minutes from the Indian side. We can directly buy things from India based on comparative advantage." (*The Hindu*, 5 February 2006) The former President of POK, Sardar Abdul Qayoom, in an interview to *The Hindu*, also said that the Pakistan government should have accepted Indian government's proposal of relief terms and supplies as well as aerial support in quake-devastated areas which are better accessible from the LOC. He said, "I do not think there would have been some major security problem had the Indian planes manned by Indian pilots been allowed this side of the LOC." (*The Hindu*, 28 January 2006)

Indian security forces who put their own lives at risk and rescued hundreds of Kashmiris from the earthquake rubble, earned the adulation of the affected people in the valley. The people were so impressed by the Indian Army's response that they wished to have the relief and rehabilitation work executed through the Army rather than the local governmental agencies. Naik Raghbir Singh and six other soldiers, who brought out 15 Kashmiris trapped under heavy debris and in the process died due to sudden caving in of rocks, before they could come out, set a rare example of valour and sacrifice. This is in sharp contrast

to the response of Pak army's delayed and indifferent response to the calamity in POK. As pointed out by the ICG Report, "although thousands of soldiers were stationed in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, it took the army three days to reach major towns and far longer to reach many remote villages". Understandably, Pak army has drawn flak from the people in POK.

The UN, World Bank, ADB and Pakistan government estimated the cost of relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction in quake affected areas in Pakistan at 5.2 billion US dollars. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) held a Ministerial meeting in Geneva on 26 October 2005 to review the response by the international community. The Islamabad Donors Conference held on 19 November 2005 received an enthusiastic response from the international community with 75 delegations including from India participating. Over 6.2 billion US dollars of international aid was pledged by the international community including 25 million US dollars by India. President Musharraf, in his address to the Donors' Conference acknowledged India's assistance and also said that "the earthquake created a unique feeling of togetherness, of an urge to help each other... within the people of India and the people of Pakistan." But Pakistan government saw to it that the state military machinery supervised the relief operations being organised by the UN and other international agencies, thereby not only marginalising the local civil society in such efforts but also empowering and securing legitimacy for the banned terrorist organisations.

Whereas civilian agencies have been marginalised in their relief and rehabilitation work, banned terrorist organisation such as *Lashkar-e-Tayyeba* and *Jaish-e-Mohammad* have been allocated a major role in relief and reconstruction. The banned *jihadi* and terrorist groups have been operating under new names thus controlling the massive funds donated by the international community for relief and reconstruction. These banned organizations are seeking legitimacy and recognition for their so called 'humanitarian' work. The recent ICG report (*Political Impact of the Earthquake*, ICG Policy Briefing No. 46, Islamabad/

Brussels, 15 March 2006) points out that the most prominent *jihadi* organizations banned by the government under the state-terrorism law and listed as terrorist by the UN- *Jaish-e-Mohammad* and *Lashkar-i-Tayyeba*, are conducting relief operations under changed names or through front organizations. The ICG Report mentions that other such groups such as *Al Rashid Trust*, *Al-Khair Trust* (front organization of *Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam*), *Al-Khidmat Foundation*, *Jamaat ud-Dawa*, *Al Safa Trust*, *Al Rehmat Trust*, *Al Akhtar Trust* etc. are busy operating camps advertising their presence through banners. Given their militant agenda, these *jihadi* organizations are even using this tragic circumstance to rebuild *madrassas* and enrol orphaned children for arms training to be used as cannon fodder in their *jihad*. A leading human rights organisation, Ansar Burney Welfare Trust has been quoted by the *Sunday Times* as complaining that the “children orphaned by the Kashmir earthquake are being adopted by terrorist groups for training them to fight in the *jihad*.”

Even during such a great human tragedy, the terrorists struck in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir in October 2005 killing the state Education Minister Ghulam Nabi Lone and 44 others in a series of attacks. The terrorists have also expanded their operations outside Kashmir to other parts of India. There has been a recent surge of terrorist activities in India including the Delhi blasts in October 2005 which killed more than 60 people. The *jihadis* have thus succeeded in dispelling the impression that the earthquake had damaged their infrastructure and capacity to kill.

It is, therefore, imperative that abundant caution is exercised by states and international agencies so that international assistance for rehabilitation and reconstruction is actually utilised to attain the desired objectives. This assistance should in no case be let in the hands of those who breed, sponsor and export terrorism.

There is a need to revive the indigenous traditional architecture and techniques which have been seen to be minimising earthquake damage. The experience in Japan, which has suffered frequent

earthquakes, shows that the pagodas have withstood the seismic assaults. There is almost no record of a single pagoda having been knocked down by any earthquake in Japan. For instance, the Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake of 1995 brought down many tall modern buildings in the Kobe area, but not even any of the 13 three-storeyed pagodas in the region was damaged. This experience is quite relevant in Kashmir, which also has had the tradition of wooden pagoda type mosques and shrines that have stood the vagaries of time.

While natural hazards may not be avoided, integration of risk assessment and early warnings, with preventive and mitigation measures, can prevent them from becoming disasters. This requires a well-functioning early warning system, sharing of data, information and coordination, regardless of political boundaries. The challenge is, therefore, to have the necessary systems, infrastructure, human capacity, organisational structures and technical capacity to utilize the early warning system. Setting up of high powered National Disaster Management Authority and State Disaster Management Authorities, for timely assessment of hazards, planning and immediate response to the disaster, would be a step in the right direction.

K. Warikoo

OCTOBER 2005 EARTHQUAKE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

Savita Pande

On 8 October 2005, a massive earthquake measuring 7.6 on Richter scale, struck Pakistan with its epicentre in the Muzaffarabad area, about 130 kms. north-northeast of Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, devastating an extended area of about 28,000 sq kms. A week after the earthquake, one estimate put the death toll in Pakistan at 38,000 and the number of the injured at 63,000.¹ The Government of Pakistan figures, as of 3 November 2005, were stated to be 73,000 deaths, more than 73,000 severely injured or disabled, over 2.8 million people rendered shelter-less and about 2.3 million left without adequate food.² Severe damage was reported in six districts of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and five districts of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK). According to another estimate, “more than 80,000 people were killed and over 1, 00,000 were injured while nearly 4 million people were rendered homeless just weeks before the beginning of the bitter Himalayan winter.”³

Pakistan Government’s immediate response to this devastation was visits by President Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz to the site a day after the disaster, moving of two Army divisions into NWFP, setting up of five advanced staging posts for facilitation and distribution of relief materials. By 2 November 2005, a fleet of more than 125 helicopters and aviation vessels had made over 5000 sorties to earthquake hit areas.⁴ Farooq Kathwari, the Kashmiri-American millionaire and founder of the Kashmir Study Group, during his visit to the quake-devastated areas of Azad Kashmir in December 2005, said, “unless one had oneself seen what devastation the 8 October earthquake had wrought, one could not even begin to imagine the scale and difficulty of the rehabilitation and recovery efforts involved.”⁵

Almost three months on, nearly 2 million quake survivors were living in tents below the snowline, 2,50,000 were in organised camps

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and another 4,00,000 were living in temporary shelters constructed at higher altitude, said Jan Vandemootele, UN's Humanitarian Coordinator in Pakistan. Some of the observations made by the report of the United Kingdom Department on International Development were:

- 75 to 90 percent of homes in Mansehra (NWFP) had been damaged or destroyed.
- In Zaran, 35 kms. east of Muzaffarabad, most buildings had collapsed. The access road was impassable and the ground had collapsed six metres.
- Out of one million population in Muzaffarabad district, 90,000 people (10 percent) were directly affected in the city of Muzaffarabad alone. In surrounding rural areas, 700,000 people (70 percent) were severely affected.
- World Health Organisation (WHO) reported that casualties were being received, even after a week, by the Islamabad hospital by which time 13,000 survivors were reported to have been treated out of an estimated 65,000 waiting for treatment.
- According to WHO, mobile teams reported infected wounds and gangrene as well as Acute Respiratory Tract Infections (ARI). Acute Respiratory Infection in the quake-hit area was reported due to freezing temperature at night and overcrowded tents, where the overwhelming majority of survivors live.
- In the Panjkot valley, an estimated 11,000 to 12,000 were reportedly awaiting surgery.
- 22 international field hospitals were either functioning or on their way in Rawalakot, Chakoti, Rawalpindi, Mansehra, Muzaffarabad and Bagh, Battagram, Gharhi.⁶

On the eve of the New Year, rain and snow in quake-battered areas of Pakistan brought more misery and hardship for the survivors.⁷ The Weekly Morbidity and Mortality Report (WMMR) published by the Pakistan government and the WHO on 9 December 2005 said that between 5 November and 2 December 2005, "a total of 30,319 medical consultations were reported in quake-affected areas in the under-five age group, of which 20 percent (6,160) were due to ARI. The report added that the rate of ARI-related consultations amongst

under-five age group was even higher and stood at 30 percent. . . .the figure of ARI amongst the under-five age group increased from 965 to 2,044.”⁸

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) report said that as of 9 December 2005, in NWFP and Pak occupied Kashmir, there were 502 camps, of which only 30 were planned.⁹ For now, there are over 150 camps that “are officially acknowledged. Many more have sprung up but there is no plan in the works for deliberate expansion of these camps to accommodate the new influx of internally displaced persons. In reality, the weather-battered and earthquake-stricken people might walk into another wilderness of poor or non-existent facilities.”¹⁰

In the first week of January 2006, Secretary General of Pakistan Islamic Medical Association, Dr. Ch. Zafar Iqbal reported that disorganised and delayed relief efforts had jeopardised the lives of quake-victims and they were compelled to live in tents despite severe cold. He alleged that relief goods were being given to only blue-eyed persons and the real deserving had to return home with empty hands. According to him, “over 70 per cent children were suffering from pneumonia and many quake survivors especially children might die due to shortage of medicines, shelter and other basic facilities.”¹¹

By the second week of January 2006, adverse weather conditions affected relief works seriously. Muzaffarabad and its surrounding areas received heavy snowfall, which paralysed the whole relief efforts. The government “abandoned its relief flights due to snowfall on mountains in quake hit areas.”¹² Pakistan’s Meteorological Office Chief Qamar-uz-Zaman Chaudhry said that by 10 January 2006, up to five feet of snow had fallen on over 5,000 feet high mountainous areas. The World Health Organisation (WHO) reported 18 cold-related deaths in these areas over the previous six weeks.¹³ Tents were uprooted in the quake hit areas due to inclement weather, and amid incidents like fire in a tent in Muhurrah Bakot village of Chakothi, which led to death of a six-year old boy.¹⁴

As the Himalayan winter bites temporarily forced the UN to halt relief flights in the first week of January 2006, a sense of isolation, anger

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and resentment prevailed among the quake survivors. There were reports that in some villages of Pak occupied Kashmir, “residents stormed UN helicopters and demanded to be air lifted to low-lying cities.”¹⁵ In the Leepa Valley, about 50 villagers entered into two UN choppers and assaulted one UN worker.¹⁶ In areas like Sharda, the local residents were reported to be complaining that they hadn’t received any aid since the quake, and that shortages have sent prices skyrocketing. For instance, prices of flour doubled and that of oil registered an increase by 40 per cent.¹⁷

RELIEF EFFORTS

To mobilize relief measures, President’s Relief Fund was established. President Musharraf set up an Earthquake and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) to facilitate the rebuilding and repair of damaged infrastructure.¹⁸ The Prime Minister outlined a twelve point strategy for reconstruction and rehabilitation. His office appointed a Federal Relief Commission and corresponding Relief Coordinator with the responsibility to oversee relief works. The military medical teams were stationed and military relief personnel deputed to facilitate the distribution of relief goods.¹⁹

On 26 October 2005, the UN Secretary General held a ministerial level donors’ conference and sought US \$550 million as immediate assistance.²⁰ By 11 November 2005, assistance worth \$2.5 billion had been pledged by 83 bilateral as well as multilateral donors. Major contributions came from Saudi Arabia, USA, Japan, Turkey, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, UK, Canada, Iran, Norway, Germany, China, The Netherlands, Switzerland, India, Sweden, Denmark and Australia.²¹ Besides logistical support from UNICEF, World Food Programme and the United Nations Population Fund, the World Bank approved supplemental financing, and the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team provided technical help for assessment.²²

An International Donors’ Conference was held in Islamabad in November 2005. While the Pakistan Government said that its request for \$5.2bn in aid had now exceeded, with more than \$5.4bn in pledges, relief agencies reportedly said that most of these are referred to long-

term loans, rather than immediate help.²³ A spokeswoman for the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in New York said, “we need more money now, and we are still at the life-saving rather than the reconstruction phase and our operations are dependent on the flow of money coming in.”²⁴ Andrew Macleod, the UN’s chief of operations in Pakistan, also reportedly said aid money flow had been “very slow.” He further added that “we have to house between 350,000 and 380,000 people over the next couple of weeks or so and then we need to keep up the supply of food and medicine. To protect people from the winter, we have to provide between 800 and 1,000 emergency shelters every day and 40,000 tents over the next 15 days or so.”²⁵

In mid-December 2005, Salman Shah, Advisor to Pakistani Prime Minister on finance and economic affairs, stated that Pakistan had secured international earthquake pledges worth 6.3 billion US dollars out of which, “3.984 billion were in loans and 2.341 billion in grants for relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction work in quake affected areas.”²⁶ Pakistan had successfully finalized negotiations with international multilateral agencies including the World Bank and Asian Development Bank for 1.47 billion dollar soft loans for the reconstruction work.²⁷ Germany agreed to write off \$128.5 million of Pakistan’s debt in order to facilitate reconstruction efforts. As per two agreements signed in this context, Germany is to write off \$62 million in the first stage and another \$66.5 million in the next stage.²⁸

The assessments as well as the Pakistani government’s relief measures were criticized by many. Imtiaz Alam writes, “continuing to keep the relief fund at \$5 billion, our Prime Minister has come up with even bigger miscalculations. While the UN top man, Jan Egeland views that the magnitude and peculiarity of this calamity is even worse than the Tsunami that killed 200,000 people in nine countries and it will require more than what was spent on Tsunami rehabilitation (\$12 billion), in our Prime Minister’s estimates \$5 billion will be required for reconstruction process in five years. Similarly, while Mr. Egeland is calling on the international community to contribute

more, our top leaders are too sanguine about the international aid that is far below the requirement. Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz should know that the international disaster-relief community is over-stretched from New Orleans to Nigeria and Pakistan. As a consequence of donors' fatigue, international assistance is drying out. That is why the initial response to the UN's appeal and our own appeal has not been that encouraging. This predicament is worsened when we downplay the figures and the extent of assistance needed on the ground, as donors are more reluctant to stretch their resources."²⁹ He further writes, "our resources and the emergency foreign assistance made available in the first week after the quake have not been sufficient to face such a huge challenge. Now, after nine days, the question remains that with the seventh largest army in the world and all the resources at its disposal, have we been able to deliver a fraction of what needed to be done? And would the military authorities be able to deliver the way they are behaving? Failure in treating and rescuing the injured people is about to produce yet another human tragedy with people dying of gangrene and hypothermia, as forewarned the WHO."³⁰ He, while lauding Zulfikar Bhutto's efforts in the 1974 calamity, raises the question, "where is that great political force called the King's Party, after its landslide victory in the local government elections?"³¹

Expressing concern about the actual assistance, one analysis explains, "if the amount pledged at the Donors' Conference in Islamabad is about two-thirds in the form of loans, then just over one-third of the \$5.82 billion is assistance. That means the actual aid is less than two billion – or about \$1.9 billion. The loans (including soft loans of \$3.9 billion) are going to increase the burden of a country with \$35 billion it owes to creditors."³²

IMPACT OF THE QUAKE

The relief operation continues to be plagued by a poor response from international donors. The UN's humanitarian cargo and passenger helicopter operation in quake hit areas was reported to be facing a severe funding shortfall and it feared that it would have to cease

operations by March 2006 unless there were new funds.³³ Months after the tragedy struck, Talat Hussian made the following assessment:

- “Inadequate food supplies and threat of diseases; over 1.3 million people who lack proper nourishment are highly susceptible to illness.
- Snowfall and falling mercury have added to these fears and frustrations. At an army-run camp of about 600 families in Garhi Habibullah, the main concerns of the tent-dwellers are inadequate shelter that is proving to be a poor shield against biting cold and a two-meals-a-day policy that leaves them and their children hungry. Dirty water, crowded tents and impending cold have resulted in various diseases. Communities are being forced down from their abode by unbearable cold. As they descend down from the inhospitable valleys of Naran and Kaghan, they add to the pressures on already overstretched and overcrowded camps.”³⁴

The immediate impact has been stated in terms of downturn in economic growth and macroeconomic fundamentals, including the balance of payments position. *Pakistan Economic Update - December 2005*, prepared and launched by the Pakistan Resident Mission of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in Islamabad in its special section *Economic Impact of Earthquake and Cost of Reconstruction*, narrates that “additional expenditure requirements for the earthquake relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction works may adversely affect the prospects of meeting the fiscal deficit target.”³⁵ According to the report, the government “continued to pursue an expansionary fiscal policy in the first quarter of 2006 financial year and the fiscal deficit increased to 0.5 per cent of GDP compared with 0.38 per cent in the same quarter of 2005 financial year. There was still a primary surplus, but it was less than half of that of last year... Revenues increased at a robust double-digit rate, but growth in expenditure outstripped revenue growth mainly because of a sharp increase in development expenditure. Consolidated expenditure of the federal and provincial governments increased sharply by 20.8 per cent, with development expenditure increasing by 58.6 per cent and current expenditure by 17.6 per cent.”³⁶

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Another fall out was the postponement of purchase of F-16 fighter planes. In the beginning of November 2005, President Pervez Musharraf while visiting Muzaffarabad to express solidarity with the earthquake survivors said that Pakistan postponed the purchase of F-16 aircraft from the United States. To quote him, "I am going to postpone that (F-16s purchase)...but while we want to carry out massive relief and reconstruction effort, the other important issue is the security concern of Pakistan..... So, we will never do something that jeopardizes one or the other - both have their own importance."³⁷

Political Implications

The poor state of country's infrastructure to deal with such calamities has been accepted by the Prime Minister himself, who said that one of the lessons learnt from the earthquake was that the country was ill-equipped to meet the challenges "as there was no institutional mechanism, dedicated organization and coordinating agency to deal with all aspects of the disaster."³⁸ However, government announced various steps including the plans for setting up of National Disaster Management Commission (NDMC) and National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) for an immediate response in case of natural and manmade disasters. The former is to provide policy guidelines and oversee the work of the Authority and the latter's functioning would be decided after a cross-country comparison and review of the lessons learnt by various countries in major disasters.³⁹ These two bodies are to be headed by the Prime Minister who will coordinate with relevant federal and provincial departments, district governments, army, civil defence etc. to implement the plans and disseminate information up to district levels.⁴⁰ Other steps include providing free of cost education from primary to university levels to the earthquake affected students in various institutions of Islamabad with special reference to the affected students of Pak occupied Kashmir. Same is expected to be followed by the NWFP.⁴¹

Criticizing the political parties as well as the National Assembly's failure to go beyond debating issues of national concern including quake relief, Dilshad Azim argues, "there was no progress in practical terms on the Prime Minister's repeated offers for dialogue on national issues

including setting up of Parliamentary Committee on Earthquake.”⁴² The MMA made use of the earthquake situation “as an excuse to put off its already slow moving anti-uniform campaign” and its major component, *Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam* (Fazl) had a little contribution in carrying out relief or rehabilitation operations in the affected areas.”⁴³ The Secretary General of Pakistan Islamic Medical Association, Dr. Ch. Zafar Iqbal said that “Although *Jama’at-i-Islami*, *Jama’at Aldawat*, *Al-Rasheed Trust* and army have launched relief operations, these are only working on individual basis without any coordination with each other.”⁴⁴

Strategic Implications

The disaster is, in fact, both a challenge as well as an opportunity for the international community since the post-9/11 global war on terror to help cleanse Pakistan of its terrorist infested hubs. On the one hand, the disaster opened gates to international community to one of the worst terrorist infested areas in the country. To quote Brahma Chellaney, “several hundred members of underground terrorist groups were reported killed when the earthquake flattened their hideouts and training schools in the two mountainous regions. Several of these groups have enjoyed long-standing ties with the Pakistani military, especially the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which reared them as part of its covert war in Indian Kashmir and its success in bringing the now-splintered Taliban to power in Afghanistan.”⁴⁵

The terrorists, in their bid to turn the calamity into an opportunity, won the confidence of the local people. Terrorists were reported to be seen with AK-47 rifles and walkie-talkies at some of the field camps set up in POK. *Jamaat ud-Dawa*, one of Pakistan’s most prominent Islamic extremist groups, has been at the vanguard of the relief operations.⁴⁶ Other “ideologically driven aid agencies” include a wing of hardline *Jamiat Islami* party and the *Al Rasheed Trust*, a Karachi-based organisation believed by the US to have channelled funds to Al Qaeda.⁴⁷ They even have gone to the extent of adopting the children orphaned in the tragedy. The Pakistan government, which had set up three rehabilitation centres for 379 unclaimed children,⁴⁸ claimed that these groups were responsible for food, clothing, boarding and

lodging, education, medical care and treatment including trauma counselling of these unclaimed children.⁴⁹ Pakistan's Interior Minister Aftab Khan Sherpao described the work of *Jamaat* and other Islamic groups as "the lifeline of our rescue and relief work", and said that the quake victims living in the *Jamaat* camp in Muzaffarabad were simply grateful to *Jamaat*.⁵⁰

Making an appraisal of the work of the extremist groups in the quake hit areas, Chellaney cautions, "international donors have pledged to build civil infrastructure of a kind that didn't exist there before... That makes it necessary to ensure that international aid is not illicitly diverted to terrorist groups or employed to rebuild the "hate factories" that churn out trained and committed extremists. The aid needs to be used to help foster development and societal de-radicalization in a region steeped in religious bigotry and teeming with Islamists of different hues and nationalities."⁵¹

Media reports reveal that the local people in Pakistan occupied Kashmir have serious reservations about American field hospitals in the quake-hit areas and they even suspect that the US had set up its army camps under the shield of hospitals. Secretary General of Pakistan Islamic Medical Association, Dr. Ch. Zafar Iqbal reportedly said after his return from quake-hit areas that the Americans, who have established hospitals in quake hit areas of Pakistan under the name of MASH, had earlier set up torture camps during Vietnam War under the same name. He further said the people of the area suspect that the US camps in these areas are meant to launch an operation against *Mujahideen*.⁵² Criticizing the deployment of four thousand civilian and army personnel to provide security to one thousand Americans in these areas, Dr. Iqbal added, "there is no use in keeping Americans in Muzaffarabad as their security is so tight that no patient can approach them."⁵³

The NATO disaster relief team in Pakistan, which has done a commendable job, is expected to be out of Kashmir by 1 February 2006. There are 26 nations contributing to the NATO team in Pakistan. According to Air Commodore Andrew G. Walton, "a request was made

to NATO by the Pakistan government for relief assistance. How could we possibly refuse not to come here and help? In these 90 days, we did everything that the government wanted. Now it is time to go.”⁵⁴

As far as the impact of this tragedy on Indo-Pak relations is concerned, an Indian English daily *The Hindu* wrote in its editorial on 11 October 2005, “The terrible tragedy may have taken place in the disputed territory but it has united the two parties that stake claim to it, India and Pakistan, in a common grief...It has opened up the possibility of bringing the two countries closer on an emotive issue, one that will strike an immediate chord with their people.” However, an Indian offer to provide much-needed helicopters to Pakistan’s quake zone was turned down. Aid shipments between the two sides have also been kept to largely symbolic levels. Rejecting some of the aid offers from India, President Musharraf said in an interview with the BBC on 20 October 2005, “we have enough helicopters, and “we don’t want to take Indian helicopters with their military personnel. Will they take our helicopters? If I want to send my helicopters to the Indian side, I am 200 percent sure, they will not take it.”⁵⁵

Similarly, India turned down Musharraf’s proposal to allow complete freedom of movement between the two sides of Kashmir, citing concerns that Islamic militants might mingle with other travelers to slip past security. Indian concerns were also highlighted by the bombing of two markets in New Delhi on 29 October 2005 that killed 60 people in which Pakistan-based *Lashkar-e-Tayyeba* has been implicated. India, however, opened five points on the border through which people could enter the state of Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistan occupied Kashmir. The disagreement between the two countries over few things even during such a catastrophe spoiled a chance to strengthen their bilateral relationship. India’s former Foreign Secretary Salman Haider, who described the October 2005 earthquake as a “missed opportunity” for India and Pakistan to have come together to make progress on the Kashmir issue, said joint measures could have been taken and both sides should have risen above doubt and suspicion.⁵⁶

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The immediate humanitarian challenge in 2006 is to get the quake survivors through the severe Himalayan winter months. The rebuilding and rehabilitation phase for well over 3 million quake-affected people will prove to be a daunting task, with the reconstruction of thousands of homes, schools, hospitals, and other public infrastructure.⁵⁷

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POLITICS OF THE EARTHQUAKE IN PAKISTAN

Kalim Bahadur

Pakistan was rocked by an unprecedented earthquake early in the morning at 8.50 am on 8 October 2005. The earthquake measured 7.6 on the Richter scale and was equal to the 1906 earthquake of San Francisco, 1935 earthquake of Quetta, and the 2001 earthquake of Gujarat. The official estimate of the death toll was 87,000 but it is well known that the actual toll was much higher. About 1,00,000 had been injured. The earthquake devastated Muzaffarabad, Balakot, Garhi Habibullah, Rawlakot and many other smaller villages and habitations on isolated hill tops. One of the major tragedies of the disaster was the collapse of many school buildings in which hundreds of school children were killed. Hundreds of thousands of buildings have collapsed including the one of the two Margalla towers in Islamabad in which several hundred people are feared to have been killed. Ironically during the first two days, the Margalla tower received more attention than the hundreds of thousands of people who lay buried in the rubble of Balakot and Muzaffarabad. The earthquake triggered landslides, burying entire villages and roads in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK) and in the NWFP. This made the task of relief teams reaching the scores of places almost impossible. Thousands of homeless people were left without shelter in the open in the cold weather. There was total breakdown of power, food and water supplies in the entire region affected by the earthquake. About 3.3 million people were rendered homeless in the POK. It was surprising for the people of the area that soldiers did not come to their rescue soon after the earthquake, even though about a quarter of million soldiers are stationed close to the place. The estimate of the number of casualties suffered by the army in the earthquake varies from 300 to 2500.

Questions are being asked whether the disaster was totally unexpected? There have been many reports which had suggested the

vulnerability of the area but no one had paid any attention. The disaster was waiting to happen. When it did happen, the response of the Pakistan government, the army and the government of the POK was very slow. As if that was not enough they tried to play down the severity of the devastation for several days. Chaudhary Shujaat Husain, former Prime Minister of the country, Prime Minister of POK Sardar Sikander Hayat and the former President of POK Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan blamed the sins of the people of Kashmir for the earthquake. Most Islamic parties were also doing the same. Pakistan is the country where nothing can happen without the army or the ISI knowing about it. It took three days for the army and the government to accept the magnitude of the earthquake. Pakistan army is being condemned by the media for not doing enough for the earthquake victims. The army could have acted quickly and with logistic means at its disposal could have reached the remote areas and could have avoided much misery to the common people. The result of the army's slackness was that hundreds of thousands of people who had been buried under the debris could not be taken out in time, the injured could not be treated and dead bodies were left to rot for days. Pakistan has been under military rule and over the decades the army constitutes the entire state structure and it has to shoulder the responsibility and be accountable for the power it exercises. The people of Pakistan remembered the failure of the army to act in time after the great cyclone in East Pakistan in October 1970. The army was ruling Pakistan then also. It was the neglect by the then west Pakistani military rulers at the time of dire need in the face of disaster and devastation that the people of East Pakistan turned against Pakistan and voted overwhelmingly for the Awami League and for Bangladesh. Political observers have pointed out that it is important that instead of shifting responsibility around or promoting the army unnecessarily in the relief efforts, the government should try to minimize the impact of such disaster in future. The army in the present case took charge of the entire area which overstretched it. The Federal Minister for Education Javed Ashraf Qazi argued that no where in the world is the army involved in the crisis management. Some people retorted that nowhere in the world a General is Minister of Education. There were

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callous scenes where the schools had collapsed and the children lay buried under the rubble while the military trucks kept passing by. By the time the Pakistan government and the army accepted that there was a crisis, Kashmiris on the Indian side had been rescued by the Indian army. The prompt action taken by the Indian army in the relief and rehabilitation work in the earthquake affected areas on the Indian side of the Line of Control has won it many friends and has been appreciated by the victims. The Line of Control was opened by India on 19 October 2005 to enable people from the Indian side to help in the relief efforts across the LOC.

India was the first country to offer assistance and the relief teams and supplies, helicopters and medical teams which would have gone on foot across the Line of Control to Muzaffarabad. Pakistan procrastinated in taking a decision and it was only after three days they responded and agreed to accept one plane load of relief goods. They refused to accept helicopters which would have been flown by Indian pilots. India gave its consent to Pakistan's helicopters to fly across the no-fly zone across the Line of Control. Cross-border phone links were allowed. India also allowed five crossing points to facilitate cross-border relief and for family meetings. The people of Pakistan and also of POK were shocked to know that Pakistan had only 27 helicopters while at this juncture about 100 were needed. Pakistan had no objection in accepting eight heavy lifting helicopters from the United States base in Afghanistan within 36 hours of the earthquake on President Musharraf's appeal for international help. Even here the American helicopters could have been got earlier and would have joined the operations but for reservations by the top brass of Pakistan GHQ. These helicopters were flown by the US pilots as according to Pakistan government spokesman the nationality of the pilots was not the issue. This did not apply in the case of Indian pilots. Till the end of October 2005, almost 30 percent of the area affected by the earthquake had not been reached which means that about 200,000 people were without assistance. About 2 million victims were living in tents and about 2,50,000 were living in organized camps.

Behind the massive scale of disaster and death a macabre political game was played in Pakistan by the army and the bureaucracy, by the political parties and the *Jihadi* groups, and even by the international community in the name of relief work. It is not a secret that the Mansehra district in POK has been serving as a large training ground of the major militant groups of Pakistan active both in Jammu and Kashmir and in Afghanistan. Mansehra district was the epicentre of the earthquake which hit Pakistan on 8 October 2005. *Lashkar-e-Tayyeba* alias *Jama'at ul Dawa* admitted that it had suffered some losses in the earthquake. Both *Jaish-e-Muhammad* and *Hizbul Mujahideen* are both linked to Osama's *International Islamic Front* and had their camps in the district. The *United Jihad Council* is also operating from Muzaffarabad. It was even reported that Osama Bin Laden had also been living in the area since last year. These militant groups had vast resources at their disposal and because they were almost on the scene and were the first to get busy in the relief work. It was obvious that the *Jihadi* groups had a definite plan behind their relief work. This was also noted by the United States. It was reported that the US ambassador had asked Pakistan to prevent the *Jihadi* groups from doing the relief work. The Pakistan government was afraid that in a situation when the government was widely attacked for being slack in the relief work any attempt to stop militant groups from the relief work might lead to backlash. General Musharraf refused to restrict the terrorist groups from the relief work but assured that they would be monitored.

The Islamic political parties and *Jihadi* groups were ready to take advantage of the Pakistan government's inability and inefficiency to cope with the disaster. The *Jihadi* groups were not only active in the relief work they spared no effort to publicise whatever they were doing. In fact the towns and villages had been plastered with posters and banners showing off whatever work was being done by them in glowing terms. Pakistani *Jihadis* took over the distribution of the relief goods and money being donated by the foreign NGOs and the Pakistani media highlighted the work being done by these groups particularly in Britain

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where one million Kashmiris live. This resulted in all the donations going to these *Jihadis* and which meant more resources at their disposal and their stronger control over the region. All British charities like Islamic Relief and Helping Hands, etc. operated only through the Islamic fundamentalist parties.

There were reports that the militant groups were picking up orphans from the devastated areas and adopting them with the intention to train them to fight in the *Jihad* in Afghanistan and in Kashmir. Pakistan's leading charitable organisation, Ansar Burney Welfare Trust, confirmed these reports. *Jama'at ul Dawa* openly appealed to hand over orphans to them for *jihad*. Some pro-*jihadi* government officials were also hand in glove with the militant groups in this nefarious work. Many children were taken away by the *Jihadi* groups and sent to *madrassas* and not to secular schools. *Jihadi* groups were also reported to be smuggling weapons and storing them in their hideouts for future use. There were complaints that these groups were forcibly snatching relief material from other relief organizations. There were reports that the *Hizbul Mujahideen* and the *Jama'at-i-Islami* volunteers were forcibly taking away relief trucks to their camps. Among the political parties, the *Jama'at-i-Islami* had the largest relief operation. They were giving greater attention to the people of the areas where they had greater support. This was true of all the Islamic parties and the militant groups which concentrated their relief operations in the areas where they had their respective bases. However, the *Jama'at-i-Islami* could not forget their political rivalry with the MQM even in such a tragic environment. The MQM's relief operation was also very large and they did not have any area of preference. Both claimed that they had done more for the victims of the earthquake than any other political party. The *Jama'at* and MQM workers even resorted to violence against each other and there was even serious exchange of fire between them. MQM accused the *Jama'at* of collecting more funds while using only a part of it for relief. The area is very sensitive and there exist many terrorist camps. Though the relief work done by the United States agencies including its army units had earned praise, there

were also suspicions of their intentions among a section of the people. The rocket attack on one of the American helicopters was not accidental but a warning shot to keep them away from a certain area.

From the day the earthquake had struck, the response at the national and international level was prejudiced with politics and was unashamedly political. Pakistan itself was to blame for this. Pakistan's image of being a sanctuary of terrorists of all kinds did affect the response. The army was paranoid about security particularly in view of the proximity of the contiguous Indian territory. The earthquake shook the nuclear establishment, and there are reports that some had been damaged in the calamity. In fact, there are reports that in the first two three days, the army was trying to regroup itself after the widespread damage and destruction of its bunkers and making up for the dead and injured army personnel. Relief work for the civilians was secondary to this task.

The MMA government in the NWFP also failed to rise to the occasion. They had differences with the government in Islamabad. They were demanding 50 percent share in all aid received by Pakistan. There is a perceptible disenchantment with the military government. The prestige and credibility of the Pakistan armed forces has taken a beating during the crisis. The dissatisfaction and resentment felt by the people in POK and in the NWFP may fuel alienation among them. People are demanding that huge expenditure incurred by Pakistan government on military aircraft and building a brand new GHQ should be scrapped. The international community and donors have promised huge amounts but experience shows that there is a wide gape between promises and their implementation. The rehabilitation and reconstruction in the earthquake area is also a Herculean task. Given the experience of the relief and rescue muddle by the government, normalization of the lives of people is certainly a long haul. The devastation caused by the earthquake will have serious and long term repercussions on the politics and society of Pakistan.

TERROR THROUGHOUT TREMORS AND TRAGEDY

Anil Bhat

Any hopes of the destructive earthquake across the Line of Control (LOC) between India and Pakistan being followed by - leave alone substantial - even sufficient relief in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK), or bringing about some unity or even a bit of respite from Pakistan sponsored terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) and the rest of India, remain dashed. While the Pakistani establishment is paranoid about utilizing the Indian Army's expertise and experience in rescue and relief operations in POK, Pakistan-based terrorist organizations operating in the Valley have proved their credentials yet further, by carrying out violent attacks at a time when tens of thousands of people on both sides of the divide have been reeling under the effects of the devastation, as well as dealing with sorrow of death and injuries of family members and becoming homeless in biting cold. One cannot help recalling the recent unprecedented floods in Mumbai, where despite an active criminal underworld, and so many men and women stranded throughout the night in all kinds of situations, there was not a single case of rape, molestation or arson.

The killing of ten Hindus, J&K Minister of State for Education, Dr Ghulam Nabi Lone and innocent villagers at a time just after the earthquake only proves yet again the diseased *jihadi* mind-set. Mirwaiz Umer Farooq, who was the first in J&K to criticize the "lack of response from India Inc", was conspicuously silent on these heinous attacks.

Before one goes into details of relief to the unfortunate quake-affected people on both sides of the divide, a look at one of the die-hard terrorist organizations and its chief is relevant. Syed Salahuddin, the self-styled 'supreme commander' of *Hizbul Mujahideen*, who announced a 'truce' after the recent quake, has been attempting to cultivate an aura of a charismatic and decisive leader whose foremost

concern is welfare of the people of Kashmir and fructification of their political aspirations through a 'noble *jihad*'. Financed with unlimited funds from Pakistan, he set up an elaborate system of recruitment of poor and hapless youth from the Valley, who were made to sell their souls with promises of monetary compensation to their families (which more often than ever does not materialize) and a place in *jannat* (heaven) for fighting for a 'just' cause. Once across the Line of Control (LOC), these innocent young people are trained and indoctrinated under the watchful eyes of "Peer Sahib", as the supremo is referred to. Clad in his trade-mark *shalwaar* suit with a golf-cap and sporting a flowing beard, his baritone voice spews venom to them, snatches from them their innocence and sense of righteousness and after converting them into half baked *jihadis*, inducts them into the Valley, where, in most cases they die in the course of operations. With this factory of terror operational for over a decade and half, many hundreds have died for the cause of this twisted version of *jihad*, but Salahuddin lives on, gaining weight by the year. Politically, a chameleon, as he saw the transformation in the aftermath of opening of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad road, he started talking about an 'unilateral ceasefire', leaving his followers wondering as to what he is up to. Shortly afterwards, he seemed beset with nostalgia to get back to the fold of his *watan*. Was it fear of being marginalized in a political wave of reconciliation that motivated him to jettison his long-cherished principles? Once in Kashmir, what justification or consolation would he give to families of those who lost their loved ones while reposing faith in his cause? The story, however, does not end here. The visit of Hurriyat leaders to Pakistan called his bluff once more. He realized that the need of the hour was to psychologically dominate the Hurriyat. So he once again switched to his high ideology and lectured the Hurriyat leaders on the benefits of unity and the need to continue the armed struggle. He got so carried away by his own renewed rhetoric that he ordered the horrifying bomb blast in Pulwama, in which twelve people were killed (nine civilians and three security personnel) and fifty injured. While this and other terrorist attacks continue unabated in the Valley amidst the tragedy in the aftermath of the quake, the questions which arise are:

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(i) Who is the enemy of Syed Salah-ud-din? Is it the security personnel, or the people of J&K? (ii) Is it advisable for the Kashmiri people to take his concern about them seriously? (iii) What degree of faith can be reposed in the *United Jihad Council* and its assurances that the civilians are not affected by their terror activities? (iv) Could it be that he no longer controls the action of his cadres? (v) Have his forsaken terrorists, out of fear and desperation, turned into mindless killers? Syed Salahuddin has a lot to answer for.

Terrorist attacks in J&K, even after the destruction caused by the earthquake and during the difficult period of rescue and relief efforts, along with post-quake rumblings, become all the more heinous, making an utter mockery of Salahuddin's announcement of 'truce'. The very fact that terrorist attacks continue at such a time too only means that there are still one too many *jihadis* up and about.

This attempt, after the killing of 10 Hindus and some other attacks, only reinforces the fact that even such a severe earthquake and destruction failed to change the attitude and aims of Pakistan supported terrorist organizations as well as their anti-Hindu bias. The change of Chief Ministers-from Mufti Mohammad Sayeed to Ghulam Nabi Azad-appears to have sparked off yet another spree of suicide-bomb attacks, which have compounded the tragedy at a time when relief efforts are on. Perhaps that is the aim of the sick but sharp minds of terrorists. On this side of the LOC at least, there appears to be no choice but for security personnel to bear with their own sorrow, while yet unstintingly assisting civilians around them not only with all the tools and wherewithal of rescue and relief, but also with their weapons strapped on.

This is also a time when the interaction of Kashmiris on both sides of the Line of Control (LOC) via the Muzaffarabad bus should have continued. While five points on LOC have been opened and many Kashmiris want to go from Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) to POK for relief assistance, why is Pakistan not allowing them?

Did the earthquake destroy any Pakistani nuclear facilities? It is reported that during the night of 17-18 October 2005, when two

terrorists tried to infiltrate towards Indian territory in Ranbir Singh Pura, they were challenged by the security forces. The terrorists opened fire on the ambush party, which responded in kind effectively, due to which the terrorists fled back towards Pakistan. In the following search, three AK-56 rifles with 262 rounds of ammunition and nine magazines were recovered from the spot. According to Public Affairs Magazine of 26 October 2005, there has been fifteen to twenty per cent damage to Pakistani nuclear facilities and storage sites in the Northern Areas, especially in Skardu, Doran and Chitral, and the local population faces the risk of contamination. But a curfew has been imposed and they are being actively prevented by the authorities from leaving the area. Because of the damage to the nuclear facilities in the Northern Areas, the Pakistan government has turned away international relief teams, prevented Indian Army relief work and Indian Air Force supply drops, and withdrawn the consent for Israeli assistance. While Western sources did not say that reactors had been damaged in the 8 October 2005 earthquake, they confirmed that missile silos had developed cracks, and storage facilities had taken a hit, and since the epicentre is likely to be seismically active for another two years, they expressed fear of further collapse of the nuclear establishments. To prevent leak of the nuclear destruction, Pakistan both bottled up the local population by imposing curfew, and did not permit international inspection of the disaster-hit areas.

If all this is true then what is disturbing is that the exact extent of damage in Pakistan / POK is not really known nor is it expected to be made public. Nobody knows the extent of contamination. No international parties have been allowed in, and it would be in the narrow interest of the Pakistani military and nuclear establishment to understate the damage or to show that nothing has happened. So, unfortunately, nobody in and around the damaged facilities is being allowed to come out, and nobody is being allowed to go in. Pakistan is now more vulnerable from its nuclear capability than it would be without it. In India's case, whatever damage the Tsunami caused to its nuclear facility in the south was immediately tended to and with transparency.

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Yet another communication picked up from a Pakistani artillery unit, deployed at Kahuta for earthquake relief, to its headquarters was: “*Higher Imam ko batayen ki 150 ke laghbag log procession nikalte narebazi kar rahe hain, India zindabad aur Pakistan murdabad... ham kya Karen?... Higher Imam se pata kar ke batayen*”. The input indicates that the protest rally was probably in connection with the lack of relief material and assistance in the affected areas of Kahuta and locals trying to demonstrate their anger by praising Indians.

The Brussels Declaration of International Kashmir Association at the International Conference on Kashmir National Reconciliation, held on 13-14 September 2005 reads:

- * Request Government of Pakistan to respect and honour civil and political rights of people of Gilgit and Baltistan and until the final settlement of Kashmir dispute, establish a democratically elected Legislative Assembly in Gilgit and Baltistan so that elected members could help local people with everyday social, political and economic problems.
- * Request further from Government of Pakistan to respect State Subject Notification of April 1927, and stop settlement of Pakistani nationals in Gilgit and Baltistan, and also to stop upraising of illegal Mangla Dam to prevent uprooting of more than hundred thousand Kashmiris.
- * Emphasise upon the Government of India and Government of Pakistan to take more Kashmiris- specific confidence building measures, and open all traditional routes so that people of Jammu and Kashmir can interact, socialize and trade with each other.
- * Take note of efforts afoot to disturb territorial integrity of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In this regard, the reports indicate that Government of Pakistan is planning to annex areas of Gilgit and Baltistan, which is in clear breach of its obligations under United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.

While for many years the situation in Northern Areas has been even more pathetic than in POK, the earthquake and possible nuclear

damage, instead of bringing any relief from Pakistani authorities has only increased their miseries, with no hope in sight of the above requests being addressed.

The Prime Minister of India, Dr. Manmohan Singh, spoke to President Musharraf on the day of the quake to offer condolences and assistance. So far India has sent about 1,300 tonnes of relief goods to Pakistan by one aircraft, three trains and over 45 trucks. The relief materials included blankets, sleeping bags, tents including snow tents, medicines including vaccines, fortified biscuits, x-ray machines, rice and pulses. This official assistance has been further supplemented by donations from private organizations. India's offer of helicopters, invaluable in such conditions where all areas are not easily or quickly accessible, was turned down by Pakistan government, insisting on their being flown by their aviators. "We have enough helicopters," he said in a 20 October 2005 interview with the BBC. "We don't want to take their [Indian] helicopters with military personnel. Will they take our helicopters?"

The Deccan Herald of 22 November 2005 observed that on the day General Parvez Musharraf launched a coup in 1999 to usurp the elected Pakistan Muslim League Government under Mian Nawaz Sharif, it took less than half an hour for the Pakistan army to take over control of the country. Yet, when Pakistan was struck by a massive earthquake on 8 October 2005, the same 111 Brigade, which did most of the needful in 1999, took eight hours to commence providing help for the citizens of the capital. The situation was even worse in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK), where Muzaffarabad, the capital, was reduced to rubble within minutes of the earthquake. Yet it took three days for the Pakistan army to commence its relief efforts there. The army was apparently too busy looking after the comfort and well being of its soldiers and officers, to be bothered about the country's ordinary citizens, leave alone those of POK.

Interestingly, Pakistani troops deployed along the Line of Control were instructed not to venture out of their barracks to help people in

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nearby villages, as the highest priority was given to preparations against a possible Indian attack! It took well over a week for the army to commence relief work even in devastated border towns like Rawlakot in POK. Meanwhile, there have been reports that people in earthquake-affected areas became victims of robbery and abduction.

The Asia Media reported on 24 October 2005 that Pakistan's ambassador to the United Nations, Munir Akram, in an interview with Public Television in Pakistan pleaded, "Pakistan needs help, support and sympathy, rather than gratuitous criticism." Akram was referring to the nature of media coverage of the 8 October earthquake, which has been extremely varied since the 7.6-strong quake hit Kashmir. From lambasting the extent of foreign aid to carping on the inadequacies of the Pakistani government's response, the tenor of media coverage has often been reproachful, both within Pakistan and also in international spheres. The Western media in particular has assessed the impact of the disaster largely through a political lens, vis-à-vis Pakistan's complex relationship with India. The coverage of the earthquake in Pakistani media tended to be critical of the government's relief efforts; it focused on reports of broken promises for relief and the army's ineffective response to the needs of the injured and displaced. While criticism of the government response is seemingly not without justification, the media itself has been divided about adopting such a focus. Writes *The Dawn* columnist Ayaz Amir on 21 October 2005: "There is a time for doing and a time for indulging in the blame or criticism game. This is a time for doing... The press should promote good causes. Of heroes and heroines it should sing. Those doing a good job of relief should have their efforts applauded." Amir, however, also adds, "If things are kept in perspective, the sharp media criticism that came the government's way initially did its share of good. Far from dampening national morale, it proved a spur to action." This sentiment has been echoed by a significant section of the Pakistani media. An editorial from the Islamabad-based *The Daily Mail* on 10 October 2005 commenting on the collapse of high-rise buildings says, "It is a pity that our concerned officials do not learn from the experiences of builders in other countries.

Anil Bhat

It is very well to look big but while looking big, safety of human beings has to be ensured. The developers and the concerned city development authorities are equally responsible for laxity which has caused enormous miseries and damage to human life and property.”

The *Sunday Times* of 4 December 2005 reported that United Nations relief workers fear that thousands of people could be killed by early snow and ice in areas hit by the Kashmir earthquake because the international community has not provided enough weather-proof tents to keep survivors warm and dry. More than 73,000 people were killed by the tremors and an estimated 2.5 million were left without shelter. Jan Vandemoortele, the United Nations Relief Coordinator, after a visit to the afflicted areas said that only one in four homeless survivors had a tent capable of withstanding the freezing conditions and it was a race against time to prevent a second wave of fatalities: “I’ve seen some tents, which are the same as I own for camping in the summer. Thousands of these tents were donations in kind and they were adequate until now, but they need to be replaced.” Vandemoortele was speaking as the first winter snows fell in Muzaffarabad. Local volunteers say that eight people died from pneumonia since the snows began, including five children. Resentment is growing among survivors that they were not being given the materials they needed to survive. There are reports of heavy-duty canvas tents being sold privately by corrupt army and government officials. Villagers from the surrounding hills, where winter temperatures drop to minus 20°C, said they had been pressurised to stay in their homes by clerics and local politicians who fear losing their congregations and constituents.

According to *The Observer* of 4 December 2005, even seven weeks after the earthquake, in some remote parts of POK, thousands of victims have still not been reached by the relief effort. Of an estimated three million homeless, only 100,000 are in official government relief camps and, according to the latest United Nations estimates, 800,000 were still sleeping in the open. UN relief official Darren Boisvert warned that 90 per cent of the 420,000 tents handed out in Pakistan controlled Kashmir were no good for winter use, though some people

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strengthened them with plastic sheets and blankets. His superior, Jan Vandemoortele, went further and described the situation as critical. “We are on a knife edge in Pakistani Kashmir”, he said, adding that nobody should be carried away by the figures of large donations to help the people of Pakistan, “exuberance about donations from the West is deadly. We need more money: we just don’t have enough aid and shelter packs to hand out.” In more built-up areas, water and sanitation systems have been shattered. Some four million people are defecating in the open, prompting warnings of disease as dark rumours of cholera and bubonic plague filter back from remote field hospitals. “There is no question that many, many people will die here, and children are most vulnerable. We are struggling to cope in our own sleeping bags in these temperatures; it’s a battle for survival for some of the aid workers,” says Dagmar Chocholaclova, a Czech doctor in Ratnoi, a village near Bagh. Her clinic has treated hundreds of cases of pneumonia and other acute respiratory infections like bronchitis. “Last year the area was under 10 ft. of snow by late December. It can only get worse, it will get worse.”

Dr. Shazhad Iqbal, examining the outline of a child’s broken leg in an X-ray and a queue of injured Kashmiris at his outdoor office explained, “It’s a difficult process, but a necessary one. We are offering the injured compensation but they have to prove their injuries, either under examination or by producing X-rays; many people are faking injuries, so our job is vital.” Over his shoulder is the line: there are amputees, grandmothers with their heads swathed in crude bandages and dozens of children in plaster casts. The process is simple “If someone has suffered paralysis or amputation, we give them 50,000 rupees (£500), for internal bleeding, fractures and finger amputations, we donate 25,000 rupees (£250), and finally for soft tissue injuries and laceration we offer 15,000 rupees (£150).”

Behind Iqbal is Major Nigel Cribb, the officer commanding the British 59 Commando Engineer Squadron, which arrived in Pakistan. He is with his reconnaissance team, deep in conversation. Their green berets stand out against the camouflage whites of the Pakistani army

escorting them through the Bagh Valley, where the engineers would be based until 18 January, the official pullout date for all non-Pakistani troops.

The presence of marine and army commandos in such a politically sensitive area of Pakistan has led to criticism from hardline Islamists who believe that the presence of the British and US forces here represents nothing more than an extension of their activities in Afghanistan and Iraq. A number of high-profile Pakistani politicians accused President Pervez Musharraf of ‘betraying national interest’ by letting more foreign forces into the country. “The presence of such a large number of NATO troops threatens our national security,” said Munawar Hussain, a deputy leader of the hardline *Jamaat-i-Islami* party. According to Cribb, his men’s official role in Pakistan is simply to rebuild schools and patrol remote mountain areas to reach the quake survivors worst affected by the weather. The only weapons they carry are their commando daggers, used for little more than tearing the covers off field rations.

Indian security forces’ assistance beyond the LOC is also unacceptable owing to the sensitivity of their Pakistani counterparts. For over five decades, the Pakistani military establishment, mostly in power, or at least controlling foreign policy and purse-strings, has spent undisclosed billions on arming itself to fight three conventional Kashmir-centric wars against India and then raising terrorist groups (globally connected to 9/11 and so many attacks since) for waging an endless proxy war against India, despite the peace process and the recent earthquake. Instead of building enough hospitals and civic amenities, the military establishment supported the proliferation of thousands of *madrassas*, from where the twisted, medieval version of Islam of hate and intolerance of non-Muslims is preached. So, poor baby Noor and so many other ailing people, who can afford to, need to come to India for life-saving medical treatment. As far as POK, its starkness and deprivation had already started becoming obvious to the unfortunate Kashmiris residing there shortly before the earthquake, when the Muzaffarabad bus service began.

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The earthquake's aftermath was a time for Pakistan's military-mullah combo government to rise above the politics of hate and divisiveness and atone itself by proving its intention of providing timely succour to those suffering from the effects of the quake, compounded by biting cold. Instead, groups like *Lashkar-e-Tayaba* stepped in where they could and its boss has promised to construct forty *madrassas* in POK, from where anti-India (to which has been added US and Israel) sentiment can be spread at a time when its people have just about begun to look up to it.

EARTHQUAKE IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR

A Report

Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra

Any analysis of the October 2005 earthquake would reveal the fact that the huge catastrophe, caused by nature and later by human negligence, has benumbed the people of the whole region and called for change in socio-economic and political equations in South Asia, despite the decades old political rivalries among the two main players in the region. The earthquake on the Richter scale 7.6 struck Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK) on 8 October 2005. This paper analyses the impact of the earthquake in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir and relief and rescue operations in the region and related problems.

DAMAGES

The impact of the earthquake in the region was quite considerable. Some 300 people died in Uri alone out of a provisional statewide death toll of 583, J&K government Chief Secretary Vijaya Bakaya told the AFP. The losses in J&K can be summarised as follows:³

- 1,500 houses were destroyed in Uri. About 90% of its population of 30,000 were affected.
- More than 1,100 houses were flattened. The main minaret of the Hazratbal shrine, which houses a relic of the Prophet Mohammed, was damaged.
- The 200-year-old Moti Mahal fort in Poonch district collapsed.
- There were over 1800 dead.
- The injured are being treated at Srinagar's SMHS hospital, Uri Field Hospital and many makeshift medical facilities. Indian Army has undertaken a key role in coordinating and running relief operations.

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- An ex gratia of Rs. one lakh (100,000 Indian rupees, about US\$2255) to the next of kin of those killed was being released from the Prime Minister's National Relief Fund.

Brief details of devastation in Poonch can be summarized as follows:

1.	No. of Villages effected	=	136
2.	Population affected	=	59000
	Houses damaged:		
	Fully	=	1524
	Partially	=	6272
	Loss of life:		
	Dead	=	10
	Injured	=	73
	Loss of Cattle heads	=	78
	Religious places damaged:		
	Fully	=	05
	Partially	=	69

In Jammu division, the district-wise distribution of the estimated cost of reconstruction is as follows: 1) Jammu- Rs 6. 30 lakh, 2) Udhampur- Rs 14.70 lakh, 3) Doda- Rs 26 lakh, 4) Kathua- Rs 14. 30 lakh, 5) Rajouri- Rs 8.00 lakh, 6) Poonch- Rs 546. 80 lakh. Relief Commissioner of Uri Bashir Ahmed Runiyal said that 1.9 lakh people in Uri were affected in the earthquake where 95 villages were fully damaged, 20 villages suffered 40 to 60 per cent damage while 30 villages suffered less than 40 per cent damage.²

Remote villages in Uri such as Kamalkote, Sultan Daki Kalgai, Dulanja, Churanda, Udhosa, Jabla, Salamabad and Gharkote and Isham, Dacchi, Maidan and Silikote on the Line of control (LOC) were seriously affected.

OPENING OF LOC

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf cited 'local sensitivities' as the reason for denial of Indian offer for joint relief and rescue operations in POK. Pakistan's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Tasneem

Aslam stated, “there is no possibility of joint relief and rescue operations on both sides of the LOC.” Pakistan’s suggestion of allowing Indian helicopters without Indian pilots showed its sense of fear and mistrust of India. Despite knowing well that India’s offer could have proved helpful as at some points India has better accessibility to help quake victims across LOC, Pakistan’s rejection only accentuated the problems of the affected people. As per reports, Pakistan’s army, after the earthquake, was busy in guarding and closing the LOC.

India offered to open relief camps at three points - Aman Setu in Uri, Teetwal in Tangdhar and Chakan Da Bagh in Poonch- on the LOC where quake victims from POK could come over and avail medical treatment and relief material. Pakistan had suggested five locations along the LOC. Pakistan, in its proposals sent to India on 18 October 2005, identified five crossing points- Tangdhar-Tithwal, Uri-Chakoti, Uri-Hajipeer, Poonch-Rawalakot and Mendhar-Tattapani. The LOC point between Mendhar belt in Poonch district of Jammu and Kashmir and Mirpur in POK became operational again through Roshi-Kanna outposts. On 29 October 2005, India and Pakistan agreed to open five points along the LOC in Jammu and Kashmir to facilitate relief and rescue work on both sides.

Eventually the trauma of the 8 October earthquake was partially overcome in Poonch district on 21 November 2005 when nine persons walked across the Line of Control. Chakan-da-Bagh on the LOC became the second point, Kaman Bridge in Uri district being the first crossing point. When it was first opened on 7 November 2005 for exchange of relief for victims of the earthquake, a large crowd had gathered across the LOC in anticipation of crossing over. Some of them had actually run towards the LOC and were deterred by the Pakistan security forces who resorted to lathicharge and teargassing. Of the nine travellers, six are from Mendhar, one from Poonch and two from POK. They had come to J&K via Kaman Bridge before the quake rocked their home region and have now walked back through the new route.

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The *Karvaan-e-Aman* (Caravan of Peace) from Srinagar to Muzaffarabad resumed service on 2 December 2005 from the Indian side up to the *Aman Setu* (Peace Bridge) on LOC with 20 passengers on board. The last (14th) *Karvaan-e-Aman* had rolled out from Srinagar on 6 October, just two days before the earthquake that ravaged J&K as well as POK. Among the 16 fresh passengers, there were 11 men and 5 women, while the 4 returnees included three women.

RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

Within hours of the earthquake, Indian army launched Operation Imdad for relief and rescue work. By 10 December 2005, it had provided over 4000 tents, 1.25 lakh blankets, 1,800 sleeping bags, 50,000 coat parka inners, 14,500 coat parka complete, 50,000 browsers BD serge and one lakh pair of socks. 20 medical teams supplied 50 tonnes of medical aid to 50,000 people, KVA generators and 18 water points to ensure proper water supply.⁴

The government of India announced Rs 6.42 billion for relief and rescue operation in the affected area. The state government announced Rs 30,000 towards the construction of a new house for each of the affected people. The Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL) provided free telephone services for the quake-hit people to contact their relatives across the LOC for 15 days from 19 October 2005 onwards at four destinations in the state - Srinagar police control room, the Central Telegraph Office (CTO), Jammu, Uri and Tangdhar police stations.

As per reports available on 15 March 2006, 26,177 houses are stated to have been fully damaged and 71,460 partially damaged while 964 persons lost their lives due to the earthquake. Following relief measures have been taken by the J&K government:

1. The state government has announced Rs. 50,000 each for the deceased and Rs. 5,000 to the injured.
2. It has announced Rs. 1,00,000 as compensation for a fully damaged house and Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 30,000 for a partially damaged house.

3. An incentive of Rs. 5,000 has been given to each family who constructed shelters before December 2005.
4. 55 community centres have been completed at Tetwal, Drigla area of Tangdhar, etc.
5. A comprehensive proposal of Rs. 13.42 billion crores has been submitted to the Union Home Affairs Ministry for rehabilitation and reconstruction of the earthquake affected.

The J&K government decided to set up Lok Adalats at Uri and Tangdhar areas⁵ for speedy disposal of the claims of the quake affected people as part of the drive to provide free legal aid to the affected people. On 12 November 2005, Chief Minister Ghulam Nabi Azad announced that the state government would frame a Disaster Management Authority soon to be ready with proper management and compatibility to face any eventuality like earthquakes, snow storm or other calamity. On 5 February 2006, Azad made his 10th visit to Tangdhar and other areas and announced that the government has designated 16 villages (nine villages in Tangdhar, six in Uri and one in Kupwara) for relocation. He said, "We have prohibited any construction there as they are prone to landslides after the melting of snow or due to rainfall."

However, large scale corruption in the distribution of relief materials, lack of coordination between the government and the NGOs and among the NGOs themselves has been reported. For instance, as on 12 November 2005, against a target of 104 community structures, only ten were built. And against the budgeted 6.5 billion rupees meant for reconstruction, the government has only been able to distribute a meagre 0.4 billion rupees.⁶ Seven officials in Kupwara district who were involved in irregularities in providing relief to the earthquake victims were suspended in last week of January 2006. Reports reveal that many political workers sold hundreds of blankets and tents in black.

Following is the number of blankets distributed by various agencies:⁷

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Agency	Blankets distributed
Government	1,50,000
Red Cross	50,000
Rajiv Gandhi Foundation	70,000
MSF (Medicines Sans Frontiers)	10,000
Action Aid International	10,000
Others	70,000

Following are the main NGOs that have been active in affected areas in J&K: Athrot (a group of 15 local NGOs working in Uri), Delhi based NGO Servants of the People Society, Vishvoran (NGO from Gujarat) in Basgran, Uri to help the affected children, Bhartiya Jain Sangthan, Kashmir Earthquake Victims Association (KEVA), Help Foundation, Haman Aid Society, and Save Our Souls.

The United Nations and aid agencies have warned of a possible “second wave of deaths” with the onset of the harsh winter. According to Zainab Bibi, a quake survivor, whose tent was covered with a plastic sheet to prevent leakage of rainwater, “We faced a lot of trouble because our tent was leaking. Thanks to Allah, the weather has become pleasant today.” Many survivors complained they could not even burn wood inside their tents to keep themselves warm. According to the Deputy Commissioner of Kupwara Abdul Majeed Khanday, the snowfall recorded at the Sadna top of Kupwara - Tangdhar road in early November was three feet. Due to this heavy snowfall at Sadna top, quake-hit Tangdhar got cut off from rest of the valley. He further opined that one of the reasons for slow pace of relief operations in these areas was that proper data was not available to the government and the voluntary organisations for carrying out the operation.

While there have been no outbreaks of epidemics, health workers say Acute Respiratory Infections, diarrhoea, dysentery and tetanus are spreading especially in cramped tent settlements across the region. Hostile weather and terrain in hilly regions jeopardise NGO plans to carry out relief activities in these areas. Doctors have warned that the children and the elderly already suffering from respiratory illness,

diarrhoea, scabies, tetanus and other ailments can see their problems aggravated.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS⁹

October 2005

8 October - The earthquake measuring 7.6 on Richter Scale took place at 0910 hrs local time striking North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, POK and J&K.

9 October - India offered helicopters and other materials for joint relief and rescue operations.

10 October - Pakistan rejected India's offer citing 'local sensitivities' as the reason. It agreed to accept Indian helicopters without Indian pilots, which was not found feasible by India.

18 October - Pakistan proposed to India for opening LOC at five points for the affected families to meet their relatives and for relief work. The five points are: Tangdhar-Teetwal, Uri-Chakothi, Uri-Hajjpeer, Poonch-Rawalkote and Mendhar-Tattapani.

19 October - Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL) provided free telephone services at four places in J&K for the quake hit families to contact their relatives across the LOC.

26 October - A ministerial meeting took place in Geneva to deliberate on earthquake on the auspices of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) of the UN.

28 October - India offered US \$25 million assistance to Pakistan at the International Donors' Conference in Islamabad. The international community pledged Pakistan US \$5.8 billion as assistance.

29 October - Indian and Pakistani officials met at Islamabad to sort out modalities for opening five crossing points on the LOC.

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November 2005

7 November - Uri-Chakothi route opened. Nine travellers including six from Mendhar and one from Poonch from the Indian side and two from POK who had come to India by Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus crossed the LOC.

20 November - Teetwal-Nauseri route opened.

21 November - Poonch-Rawlakot route opened. India sent 25 truck loads of relief materials including blankets, plastic sheets, medicines, biscuits etc.

India offered to undertake specific projects in education and health sectors in quake hit areas in Pakistan and POK.

25 November - Uri-Hajipeer route opened.

27 November - The earthquake-hit area received winter's first snowfall which obstructed the relief work.

December 2005

2 December - *Karvaan-e-Aman* (Caravan for Peace) bus resumed service from Indian side up to the Aman Setu (Peace Bridge) with 20 passengers on board.

12 December - Mendhar-Tattapani route opened.

CONCLUSION

The October 2005 earthquake, one of the worst tragedies in the last hundred years in the Indian subcontinent, brought into picture two important points. First, it showed that disasters like earthquake do not recognize political boundaries and both India and Pakistan have many things to do in common for mutual advantage. Pakistan's initial rejection of Indian offer notwithstanding, both the countries can cooperate with each other in disaster management and share information to minimize impacts of natural calamities. Second, it brought into focus that there can be more damage due to such natural calamities if there is no coordination and an early warning system. The proposed establishment of Disaster Management Authority by J&K government is a step in right direction in this context.

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IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE YANGTZE RIVER SOURCE REGION IN TIBETAN PLATEAU*

Zhang Jijiao
and
Li Yujun

Having one of the most imposing topographic features on the Earth's surface, the Tibetan Plateau, often referred to as the 'roof of the world' and the 'third pole of the earth', is very sensitive to climate change. Its complex landform with high altitude, powerful monsoon circulation and solar radiation contribute significantly to make it sensitive to temperature change. Obviously, this phenomenon shows that the amplitude of its temperature change is very large. While compared to other regions, climatic change in the Tibetan Plateau takes place earlier. The ecosystems on the Tibetan Plateau as a whole including wetland respond to global warming rapidly which is clearly visible. Previous research works have revealed that the glacier and ice cap on the high mountains have retreated considerably in the past five decades. As a result there has been dramatic impact on the hydrological regime, temporal and spatial water distribution as well as its availability, and also on the water chemistry in the whole river basins. Swamp in this area has also been found to be shrinking rapidly. In the last two decades, 647 sq. kms. of swamp in the Yellow River source area got shrunk and dried up. These changes due to the climate change directly affect not only the wetland ecosystem but also local communities and the people living downstream.

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The Yangtze Source Area is located at the centre of the Tibetan Plateau. With an average altitude of 4000 metres above sea level it is considered to be the largest ice mass outside the Earth's two Polar Regions. Besides glaciers and snow, the natural coverage of this area also includes alpine steppe, alpine meadow, grassland, swamp, and alpine shrubs. Currently this area is being administrated mainly by Qumalai County and Zhiduo County. Inhabited mostly by the Tibetans, this area is unique in preserving its socio-cultural traditions and lifestyle, with grazing (yaks and goats) being the major economic activity. In the past, local communities adopted means of sustainable livelihood in accordance with the suitability to the natural conditions. However, with the construction of the Qinghai-Tibet railway, the accessibility to this area has become much better, and scope has widened for developmental schemes such as modernization, commercialization and mass tourism. But, on the other side, climate changes mainly reflected by rising temperature in this area have adversely affected the pasture husbandry and the livelihood of local communities. At present, both the local communities and the government at various levels are lacking capacity and knowledge to integrate climate change, conservation and community development into their development planning.

To address the situation, World Wildlife Fund (WWF) China supported a project on *Climate Change and Its Impact in the Source Region of the Yangtze River* during 2004-05. The project aimed at integrating climate change into regional planning process for sustainable development in a relatively long-term perspective. The project was thus an effort to link important global climate issues with a regional setting in China, as an example of integrating interdisciplinary studies on climate change with adaptation policies and actions in developing countries. This paper outlines the major findings of the project and analyzes the issues involved.

**AWARENESS ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGES AMONG
LOCAL RESIDENTS**

Unlike the four major seasons in the world- Spring, Summer, Autumn and Winter, in the Source Region of the Yangtze River, there are only two seasons, i.e., warm and cold. During the field survey, 200 people were interviewed and the following findings came to the light:

Local Climate Change was very obvious

Among 200 interviewees, 84.50% responded that in the Source Region of the Yangtze River, climate change was most obvious. While comparing the two counties, more interviewees in Qumalai County (65.09%) than in Zhiduo County (34.04%) realized that the most obvious climate change could be found in the local areas. Similarly, between the two kinds of persons interviewed, more herdsmen (56.39%) than non-herdsmen (38.81%) recognized that the most obvious climate change could be seen in the local grassland. This view was also confirmed by most of the interviewees in the high-cold marsh meadow (60.38%). The percentage of the interviewees in the high-cold marsh meadow holding this view was more than the interviewees both in the high-cold grassplot meadow (51.92%) and in the high-cold steppe meadow (46.97%). Besides, 97.50% of the total interviewees indicated that the obvious climate change happened in the past two decades since 1980s, while 40.50% of the interviewees recalled that the obvious climate change occurred in the recent years only particularly since 2000.

Feeling of Climate Change in Cold Season

Half (50%) of the total interviewees felt that the climate in cold season became comparatively warmer in the Source Region of the Yangtze River. While most of the interviewees (62.77%) in Zhiduo County agreed that the climate in cold season became warmer than before, in Qumalai County half of the interviewees (50%) disagreed to this view saying that the climate in cold season became colder than before. Comparing herdsmen with non-herdsmen, similar percentage of

the interviewees among the herdsmen felt that the climate in cold season became either warmer (42.11%) or colder (42.11%) than before. However, most of the non-herdsman interviewees (64.18%) said that the climate in cold season became warmer than before. Among the three kinds of the grasslands, 50.94% of the interviewees in the high-cold marsh meadow felt that the climate in cold season became warmer. Again the percentage of the interviewees in the high-cold marsh meadow holding this view was more than the interviewees both in the high-cold grassplot meadow (48.08%) and in the high-cold steppe meadow (42.42%).

Climate Changes in Cold Season

In the Source Region of the Yangtze River, main climate changes in the cold season were said to be more gale (24.58%), less snow (18.33%), longer (16.46%), warmer (14.79%) than before. In particular, more gale than before was the most obvious change in the cold season. While compared with the two counties, 26.78% of interviewees in Zhiduo County said that the main climate change in cold season was less snow than before; 32.92% of interviewees in Qumalai County highlighted that the obvious climate change in cold season was more gale than before. Among herdsmen and non-herdsmen, 25.07% of herdsman interviewees and 24.29% of non-herdsman interviewees held similar views that more gale than before was the most obvious change in the cold season. In the three kinds of the grasslands, while 24.44% of the interviewees in high-cold marsh meadow said that the main climate change in the cold season was less snow than before, 28% of the interviewees in the high-cold grassplot meadow and 23.57% of the interviewees in the high-cold steppe meadow responded that the obvious climate change in cold season was more gale than before (See Table 1).

Table 1: Comparison of Climate Changes in Cold Season in Different Grasslands

	High-Cold Marsh Meadow		High-Cold Grassplot Meadow		High-Cold Steppe Meadow	
	Valid	Percent	Valid	Percent	Valid	Percent
Less Snow	33	24.44%	16	12.80%	29	18.47%
More Gale	29	21.48%	35	28.00%	37	23.57%
Longer	20	14.81%	19	15.20%	35	22.29%
Warmer	16	11.85%	18	14.40%	20	12.74%
Colder	13	9.63%	14	11.20%	14	8.92%
More Snow	9	6.67%	17	13.60%	15	9.55%
Less Gale	7	5.19%	3	2.40%	5	3.18%
Shorter	6	4.44%	3	2.40%	0	0.00%
Others	2	1.48%	0	0.00%	2	1.27%
Total	135	100.00%	125	100.00%	157	100.00%

Feeling of Climate Change in Warm Season

Over half of the interviewees (67%) felt that cooler than before was the most obvious change in the warm season. Similar views were also expressed by 68.09% of the respondents in the Zhiduo County and 66.98% of the respondents in the Qumalai County. However, while 84.21% of the herdsman interviewees felt that cooler than before was the most obvious change in the warm season, 58.21% of the non-herdsman interviewees responded their feelings in opposite saying hotter than before was the most obvious change in the warm season. Although most of the interviewees in the three kinds of the grasslands felt that cooler than before was the most obvious change in the warm season, they differed in their opinion on the intensity of the cool climate. Whereas 84.91% of the interviewees in the high-cold marsh meadow felt deepest, 71.21% of the interviewees in the high-cold steppe meadow felt deeper and 67.31% of the interviewees in the high-cold grassplot meadow felt deep only.

Climate Changes in Warm Season

In the Source Region of the Yangtze River, main climate changes in the warm season are found to be more gale (17.99%), more snow (19.73%), shorter (17.79%), cooler (14.12%), less rain (11.41%) than before. In particular, more snow than before has been the most obvious change in the warm season. While 21.65% of the interviewees in Zhiduo County realized that the most obvious climate change in the warm season was more snow, 22.43% of the interviewees in Qumalai County indicated that the most obvious climate change in warm season was more gale. Among the herdsman and the non-herdsman, 19.95% of the former felt that the main climate change in the warm season was more gale, while 26.71% of the latter believed that it was more snow. Similarly, among the three kinds of the grasslands, 23.61% of the interviewees in the high-cold marsh meadow felt that the obvious climate change was shorter than before; 21.05% of the interviewees in the high-cold grassplot meadow considered that it was more snow and 20.44% of the interviewees in the high-cold steppe meadow thought it was more gale (See Table 2).

Table 2: Comparison of Climate Changes in Warm Season in Different Grasslands

	High-Cold Marsh Meadow		High-Cold Grassplot Meadow		High-Cold Steppe Meadow	
	Valid	Percent	Valid	Percent	Valid	Percent
Shorter	34	23.61%	23	17.29%	32	17.68%
More Gale	25	17.36%	26	19.55%	37	20.44%
More Snow	24	16.67%	28	21.05%	30	16.57%
Cooler	23	15.97%	19	14.29%	29	16.02%
Less Rain	19	13.19%	16	12.03%	24	13.26%
More Glacier & Melted Snow	8	5.56%	10	7.52%	9	4.97%
Warmer	3	2.08%	6	4.51%	5	2.76%
Longer	2	1.39%	1	0.75%	6	3.31%
Less Gale	1	0.69%	1	0.75%	3	1.66%
Others	5	3.47%	3	2.26%	6	3.31%
Total	144	100.00%	133	100.00%	181	100.00%

IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON YANGTZE RIVER SOURCE

Overall it has been discovered that the local herdsmen are more sensitive to climate changes in the warm season than the cold season. This is mainly because it is in the warm season that the grass turns into green and grows up. Besides, this period is also important for the livestock breeding and milking. In terms of shorter warm season than before due to climate changes, the local herdsmen explained that earlier the warm season period was of 3 to 4 months but now it is just of 2 months duration. The climate change has, however, proved to be beneficial to the herdsmen as it has positive influence not only on the grass but also on the livestock. On the basis of the interviews conducted in both the Zhiduo County as well as Qumalai County, it has been realized that there are different distinguishing features of climate changes both in the cold and the warm seasons. On the one hand, in the cold season while in the Zhiduo County the most obvious change has been less snow than before, in the Qumalai County it has been more gale than before. On the other hand, in the warm season, the most obvious change in the Zhiduo County has been more snow than before, but it has been more gale than before in the Qumalai County. Most of the interviewees in the three kinds of grasslands expressed similar views that cold season has become warmer and warm season has become cooler than before.

IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON LOCAL ECOSYSTEM AND HUSBANDRY

According to the survey conducted in the Source Region of the Yangtze River, the distinguishing influences of climate change on local ecosystem include precipitation (14.72%), the plague (13.40%), grass quality (13.21%) and grassland (10%). In the Zhiduo County, climate change on the ecosystem has influenced discharge of river water (18.95%), grass quality (13.71%) and the plague (12.50%), while in the Qumalai County it has influenced the plague (14.60%), grassland (14.60%) and grass quality (13.14%). While comparing herdsmen with non-herdsmen, the former remained more concerned with the discharge of river water (17.90%) and grass quality (15.34%), which have been influenced by the climate change. These ecosystem changes have close

and substantive relations with husbandry as well. However, non-herdsmen indicated their concerns with the outside ecosystem changes, i.e., the plague (16.29%) and soil erosion (13.48%), which occurred due to influence of the climate change. Among the three kinds of the grasslands in the Source Region of the Yangtze River, in both the high-cold marsh meadow (18.84%) and the high-cold grassplot meadow (16.91%) the most distinguishing influence of climate change on local ecosystem has been on the grass quality. However, in the high-cold steppe meadow (17.98%), it has been precipitation.

Harmful Influences of Climate Change on Ecosystem

Four aspects have been noticed as the harmful influences of the climate change on the ecosystem of the Source Region of the Yangtze River. These include worsening grass quality (20.87%), increasing plague (17.46%), deserting pastureland (13.66%) and depleting grassland (10.44%). Worsening grass quality is the most harmful influence of climate change on the ecosystem as per the responses in both the Zhiduo County (18.33%) and the Qumalai County (23.19%). While herdsmen looked into worsening grass quality (23.37%), non-herdsmen considered degenerating grassland (19.58%) as the harmful influences of climate change. In both the high-cold marsh meadow (26.09%) and the high-cold grassplot meadow (20.31%), worsening grass quality has been considered as the most harmful influence of climate change on the ecosystem. However, there has been increasing plague in the high-cold steppe meadow (19.55%). (See Table 3).

Table 3: Comparison of Harmful Influences of Climate Change on Ecosystem

	High-Cold Marsh Meadow		High-Cold Grassplot Meadow		High-Cold Steppe Meadow	
	Valid	Percent	Valid	Percent	Valid	Percent
Worsening Grass Quality	36	26.09%	26	20.31%	33	18.44%
Plague Increase	16	11.59%	25	19.53%	35	19.55%
Insufficient Precipitation	14	10.14%	12	9.38%	19	10.61%
Pastureland Decrease	13	9.42%	3	2.34%	5	2.79%
River Water Decrease	13	9.42%	11	8.59%	14	7.82%
Grassland Depletion	11	7.97%	11	8.59%	27	15.08%
Pastureland Desertion	10	7.25%	13	10.16%	29	16.20%
High or low Temperature	9	6.52%	2	1.56%	2	1.12%
Soil Erosion Increase	6	4.35%	4	3.13%	6	3.35%
Insect Pest Increase	3	2.17%	11	8.59%	1	0.56%
Hail Increase	2	1.45%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Snowstorm Increase	1	0.72%	6	4.69%	4	2.23%
Bush Decrease	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Others	4	2.90%	4	3.13%	4	2.23%
Total	138	100.00%	128	100.00%	179	100.00%

Harmful Influences of Climate Change on Husbandry

In the Source Region of the Yangtze River, harmful influences of the climate change have not only been observed on the ecosystem, but also on the husbandry. In general, three aspects came into light: worsening grass quality (15.69%), increasing plague and insect pest (14.78%), and increasing livestock illness (10.77%). In the Zhiduo County, climate change has influenced the local husbandry adversely in the following order: worsening grass quality (13.57%) at the first place, worsening condition of husbandry (13.18%) at the second place, and increase in the illness of livestock (10.77%) at the third place. On the contrary, in the Qumalai County, the harmful influences of the climate change on the local husbandry have been noticed in the following order: the plague and insect pest increase (18.28%) at the first place, worsening grass quality (17.59%) at the second place, and worsening condition of husbandry (11.38%) at the third place. Similarly, herdsman interviewees indicate that harmful influences of climate change on

husbandry are worsening grass quality (17.76%), the plague and insect pest increase (13.39%) and worsening climate for husbandry (12.30%). However, non-herdsman interviewees differ in their opinion. According to them, harmful influences of climate change on husbandry include the plague and insect pest increase (17.58%), desertion of pastureland (13.74%), and worsening grass quality (11.54%). (See Table 4)

Table 4: Comparison of Harmful Influences of Climate Change on Husbandry

	Herdsmen		Non-herdsmen	
	Valid	Percent	Valid	Percent
Worsening Grass Quality	65	17.76%	21	11.54%
Plague and Insect Pest Increase	49	13.39%	32	17.58%
Worsening Climate for Husbandry	45	12.30%	3	1.65%
Increase in the Illness of Livestock	42	11.48%	17	9.34%
Worsening Condition of Husbandry	41	11.20%	13	7.14%
Underground Water Decrease	28	7.65%	11	6.04%
Pastureland Decrease	21	5.74%	7	3.85%
Pastureland Desertion	21	5.74%	25	13.74%
Degeneration of Pastureland	13	3.55%	14	7.69%
Saline-Alkali Soil Increase	12	3.28%	20	10.99%
Degeneration of Grass Breed	11	3.01%	11	6.04%
Unsuitable Livestock Breed	4	1.09%	2	1.10%
Bush Decrease	1	0.27%	3	1.65%
Too Many Livestock	1	0.27%	2	1.10%
Others	12	3.28%	1	0.55%
Total	366	100.00%	182	100.00%

Among the three kinds of the grasslands in the Yangtze Source Region, higher percentage of interviewees in both the high-cold marsh meadow (16.55%) and the high-cold steppe meadow (17.84%) believe that the most harmful influence of climate change on husbandry has been worsening grass quality. However, 17.99% of interviewees in high-cold grassplot meadow respond in favour of plague and insect pest increase.

**CLIMATE CHANGE AND GRASSLAND
DEGENERATION**

Among the total interviewees, 92.5% of the respondents pointed out that there have been closest relation (61%) or closer relation (31.5%) between climate change and the grassland degeneration in the Source Region of the Yangtze River. This view was supported tremendously by the interviewees in both the Zhiduo County (93.61%) as well as the Qumalai County (91.51%).

Similarly, 65.41% of herdsman and 52.24% of non-herdsman interviewees agreed that there was the closest relation between climate change and the grassland degeneration. The difference of percentage between the two communities supporting this view shows that herdsmen pay more attention to influences of climate change on grassland degeneration than non-herdsmen do. While comparing the three kinds of the grasslands in the Source Region of the Yangtze River, 69.7% of interviewees in high-cold steppe meadow agreed that there was the closest relation between climate change and grassland degeneration. This percentage of interviewees in high-cold steppe meadow is 11.21% higher than the percentage of the interviewees (58.49%) in high-cold grassplot meadow and 13.93% higher than the percentage of the interviewees (55.77%) in high-cold marsh meadow. It means that herdsmen in high-cold steppe meadow pay more attention to influences of climate change on grassland degeneration than herdsmen of both the high-cold grassplot meadow and the high-cold marsh meadow.

State of Grassland Degeneration

During the field survey, 86.5% of the interviewees pointed out that the grassland degeneration was in the most serious situation (52.50%) or in the more serious situation (34.00%) in the Source Region of the Yangtze River due to the climate change. While comparing the two counties, it was found that 69.81% of the interviewees in the Qumalai County believed the local grassland degeneration as being in the most serious situation. This percentage in the Qumalai County is 36.83% higher than the Zhiduo County (32.98%). It means, the grassland

degeneration has been much more obvious in the Qumalai County than the Zhiduo County. Both herdsman interviewees (53.38%) and non-herdsman interviewees (50.75%) agreed together that the local grassland degeneration was in the most serious situation. As regards different grasslands in the Source Region of the Yangtze River, 60.61% of interviewees in the high-cold steppe meadow agreed that the local grassland degeneration was in the most serious situation. This percentage of interviewees in the high-cold steppe meadow remains 15.33% higher than the percentage of the interviewees (45.28%) in the high-cold marsh meadow and 2.92% higher than the percentage of the interviewees (57.69%) in the high-cold grassplot meadow. It, therefore, confirms that the grassland degeneration in the high-cold steppe meadow has been in the more serious situation than both in the high-cold marsh meadow and in the high-cold grassplot meadow.

Significantly, 92.5% of the respondents stressed that the obvious grassland degeneration in the Source Region of the Yangtze River has happened in the past 20 years now, especially after 1980. In particular, 38% of them agreed that it has happened in the 1980s itself. Higher percentage of the interviewees both in the Zhiduo County (41.49%) and in the Qumalai County (34.91%) recalled that the obvious grassland degeneration has happened in the 1980s. However, in terms of grasslands, the highest percentage of interviewees both in the high-cold marsh meadow (37.74%) as well as in the high-cold grassplot meadow (33.96%) said that there has been obvious grassland degeneration since 2000. But in the high-cold steppe meadow, 48.48% of the interviewees pointed out that the obvious grassland degeneration occurred in the high-cold steppe meadow much earlier than the high-cold marsh meadow and the high-cold grassplot meadow.

Factors Responsible for Grassland Degeneration

Among the factors responsible for the grassland degeneration, local interviewees identified climate change (26.92%) as the first factor and plague increase (21.95%) as the second factor. Moreover, too much mining (12.42%) and diminishing water resources (10.56%) were

IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON YANGTZE RIVER SOURCE

also identified as the other two important factors. While interviewees in the Zhiduo County emphasized on climate change (28.11%), in the Qumalai County they highlighted the plague increase (27.44%) as the grassland degeneration factor. (See Table 5)

Table 5: County wise Comparison of Factors Responsible for Grassland Degeneration

	Zhiduo County		Qumalai County	
	Valid	Percent	Valid	Percent
Climate Change	61	28.11%	69	25.94%
Plague Increase	33	15.21%	73	27.44%
Too Much Mining	32	14.75%	28	10.53%
Diminishing Water Resources	20	9.22%	31	11.65%
Natural Decrease of Grassland	11	5.07%	8	3.01%
Pastureland owned by Household	9	4.15%	3	1.13%
Degeneration of Grass Breed	9	4.15%	10	3.76%
Insect Pest Increase	8	3.69%	10	3.76%
Wrong Husbandry Methods	8	3.69%	5	1.88%
4-complete-sets or 7-complete-sets for Husbandry	7	3.23%	0	0.00%
Population Increase	5	2.30%	2	0.75%
Incompatible Government Policy	3	1.38%	0	0.00%
Too Much Unearthing Cordyceps sinensis	2	0.92%	11	4.14%
Too Much Livestock	0	0.00%	7	2.63%
Others	9	4.15%	9	3.38%
Total	217	100.00%	266	100.00%

The herdsmen and non-herdsmen had also different opinions on the issues of factors responsible for the grassland degeneration. While herdsmen interviewees stressed on climate change (32.35%), non-herdsmen interviewees pointed to the plague increase (20.34%). Local interviewees in the three kinds of the grasslands identified climate change as the first factor (high-cold marsh meadow 33.05%, high-cold grassplot meadow 24.41%, high-cold steppe meadow 31.21%), and plague increase as the second factor (high-cold marsh meadow

21.19%, high-cold grassplot meadow 23.62%, high-cold steppe meadow 22.93%).

CONCLUSION

Based on the fieldwork in three kinds of the grasslands, i.e. high-cold marsh meadow, high-cold grassplot meadow and high-cold steppe meadow as well as according to the responses received through interviews of 200 persons, following conclusions can be drawn on issues related to climate change and its impact on the Source Region of the Yangtze River.

1. Climate change is very obvious in the Source Region of the Yangtze River: Since most of the respondents (84.5%) realize that there has been most obvious or more obvious climate change in the Source Region of the Yangtze River, there is need to pay more attention to climate change and do research on the issues involved in order to contribute to the policy planning for the benefit of the local people there. This is more so because 56.39% of herdsmen recognize the occurrence of most obvious climate change in the local grassland, thus influencing the local ecosystem as well which is more pronounced in precipitation, plague, grass quality and grassland.

2. Climate change has serious harmful consequences on husbandry: As the local herdsmen's husbandry and livelihood depend on the climate, they are very sensitive to climate changes. After visiting various households, it was found that the local herdsmen are more sensitive to climate changes in the warm season than in the cold season because it is the warm season during which not only grass turns green and grows up but also overall growth of the livestock can be witnessed. But due to climate change, warm season has become shorter than before and the total period is now just for two months as against 3 to 4 months earlier. In general, climate change has had serious harmful consequences on the three aspects of husbandry: worsening grass quality, plague-insect-pest increase, and increase in the illness of livestock. Therefore, herdsmen's husbandry and their living condition need to be paid more attention due to the adverse affects of the climate change.

3. Climate change has negative impact on ecosystem:

Grassland has the closest relation with herdsman's husbandry and their living condition in the Source Region of the Yangtze River. Almost 92.5% of the respondents recognize that there has been closest relation (61.00%) or closer relation (31.50%) between climate change and grassland degeneration. Similarly, 87.5% of the respondents agree that there has been closest relation (52.5%) or closer relation (37%) between climate change and grassland decrease. Unfortunately, the local grassland is found to have been degenerated and has even decreased. It has been discovered that the grassland degeneration and also its decrease remains to be either in the most serious situation or in the more serious situation. Overall, harmful impact of climate change on the ecosystem can be seen in worsening grass quality, plague increase, desertification and grassland decrease. As victims, many herdsmen complain about the sorry state of their livestock as a result of worsening ecosystem. Therefore, the negative impact of climate change on the ecosystem needs to be paid attention in order to address local herdsmen's complains.

4. Impact of climate change on ecosystem differs in different areas: The Source Region of the Yangtze River is an area covering a vast territory. So, impact of climate changes has been found to be different in different areas. For example, in the Zhiduo County, the most distinguishing climate changes have been less snow than before in cold season and more snow than before in warm season. However, in the Qumalai County, the most distinguishing climate changes have been more gale than before in both the cold as well as the warm season. On the other hand, climate change has influenced ecosystem differently in different areas. Among three kinds of the grasslands, higher percentage of interviewees in both the high-cold marsh meadow (16.55%) and the high-cold steppe meadow (17.84%) think that the most harmful impact of climate change on husbandry has been the worsening grass quality. However, 17.99% of interviewees in the high-cold grassplot meadow recognize the plague and insect pest increase as the harmful impact of climate change on ecosystem. In a nutshell, while doing research on

ecosystem protection in the Source Region of the Yangtze River, different kinds of impact of the climate changes on ecosystem in different areas must be taken into consideration.

5. It is not true that surplus husbandry has resulted in worsening ecosystem: In several newspaper reports, government reports and research papers, surplus husbandry (herdsman having too much livestock) has been singled out as one of the important factors resulted in worsening ecosystem in the Source Region of the Yangtze River. However, during this survey in the concerned region, both the local herdsmen as well as husbandry officials denied the presence of surplus livestock. At least 42.5% of interviewees subscribed to this view. According to the local herdsmen and husbandry officials, the number of livestock hit an all-time high before the great snow disaster in 1985, and since then it has never reached the peak. In fact, the number of livestock has decreased. Although in some areas too much livestock or unsuitable husbandry methods are said to have resulted in the worsening ecosystem, these are only few cases or partial problem and not so widespread and serious. In general, surplus livestock and unsuitable husbandry methods in no way can be considered as the main factors leading to the worsening ecosystem in the Source Region of the Yangtze River. This paper based on the completed research project report, its own academic value, seeks to correct the wrong notion that “surplus husbandry has resulted in the worsening ecosystem in the Source Region of the Yangtze River.”

PAKISTAN: POLITICAL IMPACT OF THE EARTHQUAKE*

I. OVERVIEW

The Pakistan government's ill-planned and poorly executed emergency response to the October 2005 earthquake highlighted the inadequacies of authoritarian rule. As the government now embarks on three to four years of reconstruction and rehabilitation, the absence of civilian oversight and inadequate accountability and transparency could seriously undermine the process. Should *jihadi* groups that have been active in relief work remain as involved in reconstruction, threats to domestic and regional security will increase.

Although civil society volunteers and international organisations rushed into action just hours after the earthquake on 8 October, countless lives were lost because of the military's ineffective response. The army's incapacity reflected its institutional shortcomings and neglect of the civilian infrastructure needed to manage responses to natural disasters. While civilian authorities and institutions usually undertake humanitarian relief, the military has, even after the initial emergency phase, excluded elected bodies, civil society organisations and communities and sidelined civil administration from the effort, as well as its reconstruction and rehabilitation plans.

By accepting a major role for banned *jihadi* groups in humanitarian relief efforts, the government's policies are helping Islamist radicals to bolster their presence in the earthquake-affected areas of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. The willingness of donors to accept military directives and priorities, willingly or reluctantly, has also inadvertently empowered extremists and, if extended to the reconstruction phase, could further

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undermine the prospects of democratisation in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

Natural disasters sometimes create the political conditions for peacemaking. While the October earthquake led to some minor confidence-building measures, it did not dissipate India and Pakistan's mutual mistrust. This was to be expected since banned *jihadi* groups such as the *Laskhar-e-Tayyeba* (LeT) and *Jaish-e-Mohammed* are operating under new names or through front organisations in relief efforts, thus providing ample evidence that their infrastructure remains intact. To rebuild trust, the Pakistan government must disband the networks of these and all other banned organisations.

While an effective relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation process requires broader involvement of the civil administration and community-based and national-level Pakistani non-governmental organisations (NGOs), it appears that the military intends to retain its central role. The international community would be wise to use its massive reconstruction pledges also to counter *jihadi* influence, support Pakistan's democratic transition and promote regional peace. To ensure transparency, accountability and effective utilisation of assistance, international humanitarian organisations should shift their approach from an embedded relationship with the military to an effective partnership with elected officials and credible and moderate civil society organisations.

In preparing rehabilitation and reconstruction plans, international actors and the Pakistan government should:

- work with secular humanitarian partners in Pakistan's NGO sector that have a proven track record;
- develop mechanisms to provide local communities with a role in decision-making on relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation;
- empower elected officials and institutions by ensuring their participation in the process and build civilian disaster response capacities;

- major donors and UN agencies should create and work through an independent mechanism to ensure aid accountability and transparency;
- UN missions in Pakistan and international NGOs (INGOs) ought independently to assess the government's reconstruction priorities, identify appropriate strategies and targets and exercise oversight over crucial areas such as shelter and reconstruction of the educational sector; and
- the Pakistan government should exclude *jihadi* groups banned under the Anti-Terrorism Law, including those operating under changed names, from participating in earthquake work and dismantle their infrastructure.

II. BACKGROUND

On 8 October 2005, an earthquake that measured 7.6 on the Richter scale, the most devastating for a century in the region, destroyed entire cities and villages in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), including the former's capital, Muzaffarabad, leaving more than two and half million people homeless. Eleven days later, officials reported a death toll of more than 73,000 with over 70,000 injured, which rose by November to some 88,000 deaths and over 100,000 injured.¹ Although thousands of soldiers were stationed in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, it took the army three days to reach major towns and far longer to reach many remote villages. In the NWFP too, despite having troops stationed in the vicinity of the earthquake-affected areas, the military was slow to take action.

At the 19 October donors conference in Geneva, \$580 million was promised, of which \$16 million was for immediate relief² and \$564 million for long-term reconstruction. At the donors conference in Islamabad on 19 November, \$6.5 billion was pledged (\$2.5 billion in grants and \$4 billion in loans), reflecting Western support for General Pervez Musharraf.³ However, many European donors also voiced concerns about transparency and accountability and demanded civilian

participation and oversight, as did Musharraf's political opposition within and outside parliament.⁴ The military government replied that donor funds would be used in an accountable and transparent manner but rejected civilian control and parliamentary oversight of the process. Although it was willing to countenance the rescue and relief activities of *jihadi* groups, including the renamed versions of banned organisations, it has sidelined Pakistani secular NGOs and civil administration, raising worries that the *jihadi* groups will be unduly influential in reconstruction.

The military government was also slow to accept offers of assistance from India, which had the capacity to provide timely help, particularly in the hardest hit and remote areas on Pakistan's side of the Line of Control (LOC). Pakistan even refused India's offer of emergency relief helicopters although they would have doubled the country's fleet. India, on its part, was slow to respond to Musharraf's 18 October proposal to allow Kashmiris to cross the LOC but finally agreed to permit this at five crossing points to allow access to humanitarian assistance and reunification of divided families.⁵ However, cross-border movement and relief were hampered by administrative constraints imposed by both sides - by India to prevent cross-LOC attacks of Pakistan-based *jihadis* and by Pakistani authorities concerned about Indian humanitarian assistance to the sensitive area.

Because of mutual mistrust, it appears that an opportunity to improve bilateral relations and advance the normalisation process has largely been lost.

III. RESPONDING TO THE EARTHQUAKE

A. Rescue and Relief

1. Disaster management preparedness

Thousands of civilian volunteers and hundreds of local NGOs responded promptly in the affected areas but the military government was slow to react. The absence of the necessary civilian infrastructure

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and systems to manage and mitigate the effects of a natural disaster was largely responsible for this inept response. No state institution had paid heed to seismic reports about the vulnerability of the region to severe earthquakes. A representative of an international humanitarian non-governmental organisation (INGO) in Pakistan said that "a possible natural disaster was a major priority for his organisation since 2005" because of the concentration of the population "in geographically unstable areas".⁶ In its 2003 report, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) concluded that "the situation strongly advocates the need for a disaster management structure, a comprehensive preparedness and mitigation strategy as well as a mitigation policy in order to better manage and coordinate activities of various line ministries and departments and civil society".⁷

UNDP Assistant Resident Representative Zafar Iqbal confirmed that his organisation had prepared a disaster response management programme and was concerned about the risks of a devastating earthquake in the region. Had the government responded to these concerns and suggestions and had a disaster management plan been in place the day the earthquake struck, the impact could have been minimised. Instead, "...the bodies didn't have the right orientation. Nobody was able to manage the right elements on time".⁸

2. Military response

The earthquake occurred at 08.50 Pakistan Standard Time. In many of the affected areas, the government failed to respond in the first critical 48 hours, when many lives could have been saved. In fact, the response came almost 72 hours later in some of the worst-hit areas. Despite its massive resources, the Pakistan army was clearly unprepared to cope with such a natural disaster. Its response was also shaped by institutional priorities and security concerns, such as assessing and responding to military casualties in AJK and securing the LOC. A rigid military chain of command hampered the rescue and relief process. In the absence of clear instructions from General Headquarters, army officers and troops were unwilling to act. Troops

stationed in Kashmir reacted as if they were in a state of war, not faced with a natural disaster.

In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, with many forward bases destroyed and hundreds of troops killed, the military's top priority was securing its positions in Kashmir. It rushed reinforcements to the area, deploying within the first two days two brigades along and near the LOC. A local journalist said:

Throughout the long journey [from Abbottabad in the NWFP to AJK's capital Muzaffarabad], I saw soldiers lined up on both sides of the road, fully armed and in military fatigues. I stopped a few times and asked them to reach out to people in distress. They said they did not have orders from their superiors to do so. The response was more fitting for a military attack by an enemy force rather than that of a force of nature.⁹

Where the military did respond, it was at times more a hindrance than help. In Mandian town in NWFP's Mansehra district, for instance, armed soldiers in combat fatigues encircled the area, hampering instead of helping civilian volunteers who were trying to remove rubble and rescue survivors. It did not take long for the frustrated crowd to express its anger, forcing the troops to leave.¹⁰ In Islamabad, the federal capital, where a residential high-rise building, the Margalla Towers, had collapsed, residents and relatives of people trapped in the rubble tried to retrieve bodies and survivors. But the first army contingents arrived hours later and were ill-equipped to help even though Islamabad is just minutes from the army's headquarters in Rawalpindi. The fully armed soldiers appeared far more ready to fight than to take humanitarian action.

While the military lacked the capacity to respond effectively, it insisted on controlling the process. On 10 October, the government created a Federal Relief Commission. Officially tasked with streamlining relief efforts with relevant ministries, provincial governments, and NGOs, and placed under the Prime Minister's Secretariat, in practice the agency institutionalised the military's control over relief coordination, a role it is not well prepared for.¹¹ "It is not the military's role to lead such

a response but it is something this military regime refuses to understand", said Ayub Tanoli of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP).¹²

"We had to cooperate on the ground with an institution which was logistically very effective but completely incapable of assessing needs properly and targeting humanitarian priorities", said one aid worker.¹³ Stressing that the military did not target the delivery of relief goods to the most affected areas, he added: "At the beginning, the military's strategy was to deliver and to assess needs at the same time. As a result, humanitarian coordination and needs assessment were poor".¹⁴ In fact, the military waited for almost three weeks before moving to an integrated humanitarian approach of providing survivors with shelter, food and medical supplies.

Rejecting opposition criticism of the military's inept response, the Education Minister and former Inter-Services Intelligence chief, Lt. General Javed Ashraf Qazi, passed the buck, emphasising that the army was not responsible for crisis management and disaster relief. "These functions are carried out by the civil administration", he told the National Assembly, the lower house of parliament.¹⁵ And yet, as international aid and relief organisations arrived, the army took control of every task the minister had said was outside its professional competence. All decision-making still remains in military hands; army officers retain all key roles, from aid management to distribution and liaising with the UN and foreign and local NGOs.

3. Marginalising civilians

Civilian agencies were sidelined in rescue and relief operations, and parliament was excluded from decision-making. A single official relief fund, the "President's Relief Fund for Earthquake Victims 2005", was established without parliament's approval. There is no parliamentary oversight over donations channelled through this fund. Federal relief and reconstruction bodies were formed without consultation with either the national parliament or local and provincial governments. Rejecting several adjournment motions of the pro-democracy Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD),¹⁶ the

government bypassed parliamentary approval even on major decisions such as NATO's role in relief operations.¹⁷

Justifying the military-controlled process on the grounds that civilian authority had virtually collapsed in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and was incapable of meeting the task in NWFP, the military systematically sidelined civilian administrators, and, as a result, failed to use their expertise in assessing and meeting local needs.¹⁸ A former senior bureaucrat stressed that "the timely mobilisation of the civil administrations of the unaffected provinces in coordinating the systematic dispatch and...orderly onwards transportation of relief goods to the base camps in the affected areas would have averted unnecessary chaos".¹⁹ An HRCP fact-finding mission concluded that the military was deliberately "marginalising the local civil administration, instead of involving it".²⁰

President Musharraf's political restructuring had made local government subservient to and dependent on the military-dominated centre.²¹ In NWFP, for instance, *nazims* (elected mayors) headed district coordination committees but army representatives who dictated, rather than participated in, decision-making marginalised their role. HRCP's fact-finding team was told by a commanding officer that he had made the district *nazim* responsible for coordination meetings but kept "a check on him".²² Even with their limited capacity, Union Councils, the lowest tier of local government, could have been a valuable resource for identifying local stakeholders and priorities but they were not consulted. The military also sidelined national NGOs such as the Edhi Foundation, which has a proven capacity for working countrywide. The representative of an international organisation, which had worked in NWFP since January 2005, said, "NGOs previously working in the region have created trustful ties [which] should have logically resulted in government support for their work on the ground".²³ But the military-controlled centre appeared more interested in supporting its clients at the local and provincial levels.

By the selective distribution of state resources and authority, the military's response exacerbated divisions at the local and provincial

levels.²⁴ In NWFP, for instance, the *Baitul Maal* (treasury) of the provincial religious affairs ministry is tasked with distributing compensation money and relief goods. However, the department's outreach and capacity is limited. Since the provincial government is often at odds with local elected bodies, coordination is also weak. Moreover, irregularities in distribution have caused discord resulting, for instance, in thousands of earthquake survivors in Balakot protesting against local corruption and political discrimination in the distribution of relief goods.²⁵

B. From Relief to Reconstruction

The military government's emergency and relief response will likely be duplicated in its reconstruction and rehabilitation policies. Established by General Musharraf on 12 October, the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) is tasked with overseeing those policies. Initially headed by Lt. General Mohammad Zubair²⁶ and now under a former privatisation minister, Altaf Saleem, the ERRA is formally a part of the Prime Minister's Secretariat but in fact remains under the military's control, without meaningful civilian oversight or parliamentary purview.

1. Transparency and accountability

"Accusations of corruption in the distribution of compensation and relief goods, of mismanagement, and lack of clear-cut policies point to the urgent need for an independently controlled system of monitoring" - Human Rights Commission of Pakistan's Fact-Finding Mission.²⁷

The \$6.5 billion pledged at the November 2005 donors conference in Islamabad was \$1.4 billion more than the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank estimate for reconstruction. Given Pakistan's pervasive and institutionalised corruption, an effective mechanism for handling this money is essential.²⁸ Aid donors also fear they might end up subsidising the defence budget if their funds for reconstruction were diverted to the social sector and national social sector funding was thus freed for other

purposes.²⁹ Accordingly, the UN has appointed a special adviser to cooperate with the government in an effort to ensure transparency and accountability.

Musharraf's political opposition called for creation of a watchdog body to monitor military-run relief activities.³⁰ It also demanded the establishment of a bipartisan parliamentary body to scrutinise the President's Relief Fund and supervise the federal relief and reconstruction agencies.³¹ A parliamentary committee created to monitor relief and reconstruction efforts, however, has only a consultative role. Rejecting the committee's terms of reference, the opposition Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy has refused to participate.

To allay donor concerns, the government set up a number of nominal bodies. In November 2005, an oversight committee was established to provide transparency in the President's Relief Fund. But the committee, headed by the State Bank Governor and composed mainly of former ministers, is neither neutral nor independent. The Special Directorate General Audit, constituted under the Auditor General of Pakistan and tasked with reviewing expenditures from public accounts, is also unlikely to hold military officials accountable.³² In any case, ERRA and its officials are protected by Section 11 of the ERRA charter, which states, "no suit, prosecution, [or] other legal proceedings shall lie against the Authority, the Council, the Board, the Chairperson, or any member, officer, advisers, experts or consultants in respect of anything done in good faith".³³

The need for transparency and accountability during the reconstruction phase is underscored by the problems in relief delivery. Earthquake survivors and credible independent observers such as the HRCP have identified several flaws. HRCP is particularly concerned about the implementation of two key policies: compensations for deaths and transitional shelter.³⁴ Incorrect data created problems in delivering compensation, and the policy itself was flawed. "While they [the authorities] are committed to compensate Rs.100,000 (\$1,700) per death, they're currently compensating only one death per family", said HRCP's Mansehra representative.³⁵

Assistance to help survivors rebuild their homes and lives was also marred by widespread local corruption and discrimination in distribution. In Kashmir, the opposition PPP party and the pro-independence Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) complained that their supporters were denied assistance.³⁶ In NWFP, the welfare wings of the *Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam* (JUI) and *Jamaat-i-Islami* (JI), the two major partners in the six-party *Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal* (MMA)-run government were the primary beneficiaries of provincial relief funds. For instance, NWFP senior minister and JI Provincial *Amir* (chief) Siraj-ul-Haq granted \$300,000 to the Al-Khidmat Trust, his party's welfare wing from the provincial treasury.³⁷ Bureaucratic rigidity also hampered the distribution of relief goods. In Garhi Habibullah, for instance, hundreds of survivors were denied relief goods because they failed to produce national identity cards.³⁸ Households headed by women were discriminated against while Afghan refugees, who lacked Pakistani identity cards, were largely overlooked.

The transitional shelter strategy was equally ill-conceived and poorly implemented. The government committed itself to providing free corrugated, galvanized iron (CGI) sheets for the construction of transitional shelters in regions higher than 5,000 feet.³⁹ While military engineers were asked to develop a need-based strategy through community involvement, they opted instead for house-by-house rebuilding. A UN official in Mansehra said, "needless to say, this creates problems of inequitable distribution".⁴⁰

2. Reconstruction and governance

At the November donors conference, the European Union (EU) had urged Pakistan to seek parliamentary approval for ERRA, a suggestion the government rejected, justifying its executive decision on the disaster's magnitude. UN agencies and international financial institutions appear to have accepted this explanation at face value. UNDP's Country Director in Pakistan, Haoliang Xu said that the "earthquake's response required extraordinary measures".⁴¹ He also accepted the decision to create special audit arrangements and

procurement guidelines for ERRA as "an attempt to avoid bureaucratic bottlenecks and ensure the speedy execution of thousands of new projects".⁴² An ADB official agreed: "It would take years to award thousands of contracts under normal official procedures, which is why it has been decided that existing rules will not apply to projects undertaken by ERRA".⁴³ Concerns about the military-dominated process explain, however, why many donors prefer to disburse their funds through multiple sources. While a number of Western donors will partly support reconstruction through ERRA, a substantial amount will remain with traditional project funding.⁴⁴

Reconstruction requires a bottom-up approach with stakeholders, particularly local communities, shaping the process. "We traditionally interact a lot with communities. If it is one of our concerns at the stage of the relief, it must be our first priority at the reconstruction stage", acknowledged an INGO representative.⁴⁵ But this would require a civilian as opposed to a military-dominated reconstruction process. "It's a methodological question: who really knows what the social good is and how it can be achieved?", Professor Rasul Baksh Rais explained.⁴⁶

The Pakistan government has agreed to the governance principles in the World Bank and ADB's 15 November 2005 "Preliminary Damage and Needs assessment",⁴⁷ as well as other documents prepared by the two institutions, which are meant to serve as the basic guidelines for reconstruction.⁴⁸ But ERRA's charter and functioning contradict these principles. Its officials are exempted from accountability, and its functioning reinforces military control of the process, undermining what should be the transition from military-led relief to civilian-administered reconstruction.

The European Union's suggestion for parliamentary approval of ERRA and the Federal Relief Commission and decentralisation of decision-making should be supported by other donor nations, who should also demand an oversight role for parliament.⁴⁹

IV. THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

A. The International Community and the Military

The international community's close cooperation with the military was understandable in the rescue and even the relief phases since the military was the only agency that could deliver logistically. According to a senior UN official, the military provided "key logistical support to the United Nations agencies, and facilitated, in most cases, the work of the NGOs".⁵⁰ The country director for Care International, Navaraja Gyawali said, "most humanitarian organisations would have been paralysed" without the military's logistical support. "We need the military helicopters, and the Pakistani army has made every logistical facility available to us".⁵¹

But the international community appears to have gone too far with its acceptance of a longer-term military role. As reconstruction begins, international agencies and NGOs should focus instead on establishing a closer working relationship with civilian institutions and building civilian capacity. Most international agencies have more experience working with fragile and failed states than one like Pakistan, whose military dominates the state and its institutions. The overly close working relationship they have established and maintained with the Pakistan army has given President Musharraf an opportunity to put a military face to their relief operations.⁵² By doing so, the high command hopes to regain the credibility lost by its ill-planned and poorly executed emergency response and also to project the military internationally as Pakistan's sole organised and effective institution.

Speaking to the media at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Musharraf said: "I can very proudly say that the world has learned how to handle a catastrophe, because I think we have done much better than other calamities around the world. Pakistan is being quoted as a textbook of how to handle major catastrophes".⁵³ And paying tribute to the army's rescue and relief operations, he said, "I take pride in being the leader of this army".⁵⁴

The earthquake offered an opportunity to help build the capacity of Pakistani and Kashmiri civil society and to address issues of governance and democratisation. Instead, as one representative stressed, "Our dependence on the military machinery could constrain this window of opportunity".⁵⁵ By collaborating so closely with the military, the international community has also lost some of the goodwill it gained through its relief operations with democratic Pakistani parties and civil society. While most Pakistanis and Kashmiris, for instance, lauded NATO's work, President Musharraf's decision to authorise the alliance's disaster relief mission without parliamentary discussion or approval was strongly condemned by many opposition parties who would otherwise have supported it.⁵⁶

Some international bodies, including UN agencies, believe collaboration with the military will pay dividends by providing opportunities to participate in the reconstruction process. As a result, they actively seek a close working relationship.⁵⁷ Unless international humanitarian agencies reduce their dependence, however, they risk undermining their operational effectiveness and their influence on decision-making during the reconstruction phase.

B. The International Community and Islamist Organisations

Through their close cooperation with the military, some UN agencies and international humanitarian organisations have also established, by default, a working relationship with Islamist organisations, including in some instances banned *jihadi* groups.

With the military controlling the distribution channels of international relief goods, preferential access gave both Islamist parties and banned *jihadi* groups opportunities to win local support in the immediate aftermath and weeks following the earthquake. They also gained domestic and even international recognition for their humanitarian work. UN agencies and INGOs also largely initially overlooked major non-sectarian organisations. Said a UN official, "the UN was working blind. As a result they relied on a local partner with the best facilities:

the army". Many UN agencies, he added, "were only now discovering the vast network of secular NGOs".⁵⁸

The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) supplies shelter and non-food items such as blankets to Islamist groups in Battagram and Balakot in NWFP. A camp manager of Al-Rasheed Trust, an organisation listed as terrorist by the UN, confirmed that his organisation's refugee camps were among those that received UNHCR tents.⁵⁹ Local and Islamabad-based UNHCR representatives acknowledge that such relationships with *jihadis* are problematic but they attribute them to the difficulties they face in controlling the distribution of aid.⁶⁰ Although some senior international officials believe that engaging with the *jihadi* organisations would "help us win hearts and minds" by showing "a human face to these groups that we are here for humanitarian work and do not have an ulterior motive",⁶¹ others are deeply concerned about the political implications as well as security threats to their field workers.

Workers from the *Jamaat-ud-Dawa* (JD, the new name the *jihadi Lashkar-e-Tayyeba* gave itself after it was banned by Musharraf and listed as terrorist by the UN) have urged some female humanitarian staff workers to wear the veil. Pressured by Al-Rasheed Trust, one international NGO was forced to remove female staff from a *jihadi*-run camp. There is gender segregation, enforced prayers, and compulsory Islamic education at JD relief camps in Mansehra.⁶² UNICEF is particularly concerned about unmonitored *madrassa* "tent schools" in places like Battagram but believes that it is the government's responsibility to act.⁶³

U.S. Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker has asked the government to monitor, and if necessary, stop *jihadi* groups from conducting relief work.⁶⁴ International humanitarian organisations should substitute their engagement with Islamist organisations, especially the *jihadi* variant, for partnerships with national secular and non-sectarian national organisations which have a proven capacity for working with local communities.

V. THE ISLAMIST ROLE

A. Who's Who of Islamist Organisations in Earthquake Relief

For most analytical purposes Islamist groups around the world can be usefully divided: missionary groups that have no political agenda, organisations with a political agenda that eschew violence, and *jihadi* outfits that advance their political agenda through violent means.⁶⁵ These distinctions are frequently not clear-cut in Pakistan, where, aside from some missionary groups that have no political agenda, many of the country's Islamic political movements, including its Islamic political parties, have generally maintained close links with *jihadi* organisations or even have *jihadi* wings. This difficulty in distinguishing between political and *jihadi* strains of Islamism in Pakistan has complicated efforts to find appropriate Islamic entities with which to work in response to the earthquake.

Pakistan has 58 religious political parties and 24 known militant groups. The religious political parties also have militant wings or maintain links with local and regional *jihadi* networks. The *Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam* (JUI) and the *Jamaat-i-Islami* (JUI), major partners in the six-party ruling MMA alliance in NWFP and Balochistan, are two of the most prominent religious parties. Both have been involved with regional *jihad*s, in Kashmir and Afghanistan, conducted at the military's behest. The JI's subsidiaries include the *Hizbul Mujahideen*, one of the most prominent *jihadi* organisations in Kashmir. Key Al Qaeda figures, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, have been apprehended at the homes of JI religious leaders and activists. The JUI was and remains a supporter of the Taliban, many of whom graduated from its *madrasas*. The JUI-Fazlur Rehman also draws its recruits from *Jamiat-ul-Ansar* (the renamed *jihadi Harkatul Mujahideen*, another prominent *jihadi* organisation in Kashmir), which maintains bases in the NWFP.⁶⁶ These two religious parties, which may be considered the chief patrons of the *jihad* in Pakistan, are involved in earthquake relief through their welfare wings, the JUI through Al Khair Trust and the JI through Al Khidmat Foundation.

Two of the most prominent *jihadi* organisations banned by the government under the Anti-Terrorism Law and listed as terrorist by the UN - *Jaish-e-Mohammad* and *Laskhar-e-Tayyeba* - are conducting relief operations under changed names or through front organisations. Still others, such as Al-Rasheed Trust, were not banned but were placed on the Pakistan government's terror watch list and designated terrorist by the UN, are also active in relief.

1. Party-affiliated organisations

(a) Al-Khair Trust

It is the welfare wing of the Jamiat *Ulema-e-Islam* (JUI), which dominates the MMA government in the NWFP. Maulana Ataur Rehman, JUI chief Fazlur Rehman's brother, heads Al-Khair's relief operations,⁶⁷ in which it represents the MMA provincial government. It draws its recruits from *Jamiat-ul-Ansar* (the renamed *Harkatul Mujahideen*), which has maintained *jihadi* bases in the NWFP districts of Mansehra and Kohistan since the early 1990s.⁶⁸ It has no previous history of humanitarian work in the NWFP or Kashmir but has been allocated land in Garhi Habibullah in NWFP to construct houses for survivors⁶⁹ and is building similar housing estates in the Punjab provincial capital, Lahore, and in Rawalpindi, the army headquarters.

(b) JI's Relief Network

The *Jamaat-i-Islami* (JI) is the most active of religious parties in the earthquake-hit areas and works through a number of subsidiaries. Led by Al-Khidmat Foundation, which also runs Islamic educational services in the relief camps, other JI subsidiaries include the *Hizbul Mujahideen*, one of the most prominent *jihadi* organisations in Kashmir, Pakistan Islamic Medical Association (PIMA), *Islami Jamiat Talaba*, the JI's student wing, and the *Tanzeem al-Asataza* (JI's teachers union). All these JI-backed organisations are connected through a central committee at party headquarters in Mansoor, Lahore. International relief organisations and local authorities consider the JI's relief network the most organised and efficient, but its *jihadi* links, through its militant wing, notably *Hizbul Mujahideen*, are evident.

2. Prominent jihadi groups using new identities or front organisations to conduct relief work

(a) Al-Rasheed Trust

Praised by the Pakistan government, including General Musharraf, for its relief work, Al-Rasheed Trust is a Deobandi organisation. It publishes two of the most widely read *jihadi* publications, *Islam*, a daily, and the weekly *Zarb-e-Momin*. The Trust is closely associated with *Jaish-e-Mohammed*, a Deobandi *jihadi* group active in Indian Kashmir. Banned by the Musharraf government in January 2002, the Jaish was renamed *Khuddamul Islam*.⁷⁰ Although the UN Security Council included Al-Rasheed Trust on its list of sanctioned organisations for links to Al Qaeda, the government has not banned it but only placed it on the terrorist watch list.

The Trust's philosophy is reflected in a speech of its late founder, Mufti Rasheed Ahmed: "All those who believe in *Allah* must, as a part of their faith, participate in *jihad* ... anyone who denies this aspect of Islam, and has no inclination of participating in an armed struggle, is undoubtedly a *kafir* (disbeliever) and excluded from Islam".⁷¹

The Trust was one of the first groups to reach Balakot, the worst hit subdivision in the NWFP. Prior to the earthquake, it had a very limited presence in the earthquake hit areas. Relief workers call it the "darling of the military authorities".⁷²

(b) Jamaat-ud-Dawa

Singled out for praise by Musharraf for its swift response and sustained relief efforts during the first few weeks of the earthquake, Jamaat-ud-Dawa is the renamed *Lashkar-e-Tayyeba* (LeT), which was declared a terrorist organisation and banned by his government in January 2002.⁷³ Headed by Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, JD belongs to the *Ahle Hadith* sect. It has been active in Indian Kashmir since the early 1990s and has a significant presence in Pakistan-administered Kashmir through its training camps. Most JD relief and rescue workers are neither Kashmiris nor Pashtuns. The JD field hospital in

Muzaffarabad was initially headed by Dr Amir Aziz Khan, who was arrested in October 2002 for links to the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. Although he admitted meeting bin Laden, the charges were dropped.⁷⁴

(c) *Al-Safa Trust*

A relatively new name on the *jihadi* scene, and active from Abbotabad in the NWFP to the Line of Control in Kashmir, Al-Safa's parent organisation, the *Al-Badr Al-Mujahideen*, has had a significant presence in the non-Pashtu speaking areas of NWFP since 1989.⁷⁵ Unlike *Jamaat-ud-Dawa* and *Jaish-e-Mohammed*, which have traditionally recruited their *jihadis* from other regions, *Al-Badr's jihadis* come from the earthquake-hit districts of the NWFP, especially Mansehra district. An *Al-Badr* banner in Mansehra proclaims that the organisation is the "custodian of the blood of 10,000 *mujahideen*".

(d) *Al-Rehmat Trust*

Although banned by the Musharraf government and on the list of UN-sanctioned organisations, *Jaish-e-Mohammed* is conducting relief work through Al-Rehmat Trust, a Karachi-based charity which had no presence in the earthquake-affected areas before October 2005.

(e) *Al-Akhtar Trust*

A Deobandi organisation, also on the UN list, Al-Akhtar Trust's head office is in Jamia Ashraful Madaris, a prominent Karachi *madrassa*. It raises funds for *jihadi* groups in Kashmir and Afghanistan, including the Taliban, and has close links with *Harkatul Mujahideen* and *Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami*.

B. *Jihadi Relief Activity*

Officials have identified as many as seventeen groups that have either been banned by the Musharraf government or placed on its terrorism watch-list but are involved in relief activities.⁷⁶ These *jihadi* groups openly operate relief camps, distribute relief goods and advertise their presence through banners and billboards at their camps and along the main streets of earthquake-affected cities.⁷⁷

The government stressed that help from any quarter was welcome at a time of dire need, when state institutions and agencies had been rendered non-functional by the magnitude of the disaster. However, the government went farther, portraying the *jihadis* as the prime contributors to relief work, ignoring the contributions of countless non-sectarian NGOs, charities and civilian volunteers. Interior Minister Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao, for instance, said, "they (the *jihadis*) are the lifeline of our rescue and relief work in Azad Kashmir right now".⁷⁸

On the other hand, a volunteer paramedic commented that:

It is surprising that there has been so little media coverage of the work of Pakistan's largest humanitarian charity, the Edhi Foundation, which also has the most skilled workers and the largest ambulance service anywhere in the country. Relief has become a political game and only those organisations that are promoting the military's political agenda are projected by the media even if their actual contribution does not go beyond setting up camps and running public relations campaigns.⁷⁹

Jihadi groups could react quickly and remain active in the earthquake-hit areas for a number of reasons. Despite Musharraf's claims of banning militant outfits and dismantling their infrastructure, *jihadi* training camps and bases had remained intact in NWFP and AJK. Mansehra district had a particularly sophisticated *jihadi* infrastructure. "We know these mountains like the backs of our hands after more than a decade of fighting Indian rule in occupied Kashmir, but now we are engaged in a new holy war by helping victims of the earthquake", said a *Jamaat-ud-Dawa* volunteer in Balakot.⁸⁰

In AJK too, there was a widespread, well-entrenched and well-equipped *jihadi* network. In the initial post-earthquake phase, for instance, *Jamaat-ud-Dawa* was able to field 350 workers in Muzaffarabad despite its own losses. "Our workers were connected to one another through wireless systems, we had sixteen ambulances and motorboats, as well as mobile X-ray machines and operation theatres to treat our injured *jihadis*" and enough food "to feed 3,000 people daily during the first week", said Abu Muaz.⁸¹

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If the *jihadi* organisations benefited from their regional networks and access to sophisticated technology, the religious parties, who are also sponsors of *jihad*, made their presence felt through their subsidiaries, including their welfare, educational and militant wings. Using local mosques and *madrasas* to network and coordinate their activities, the religious parties, especially the JUI, inducted professional volunteers countrywide, including doctors, students, lawyers, teachers and labour leaders, to expand their relief operations.

Local charitable donations, in cash and kind, as well as external assistance channelled through domestic religious organisations from among other sources the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia, have benefited both the religious parties and their *jihadi* allies.⁸² Al-Rasheed Trust, for instance, claims to receive support, through its media outlet *Islam*, from the Saudi Relief Centre.⁸³ JD officials also acknowledge that Saudi charities assist them.

Although the *Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal* runs the NWFP provincial government, it has preferred to work more with Islamist groups than through the provincial and local civilian administration and agencies. Using their official clout, the two dominant parties in the alliance, the JUI and the JI, have favoured their subsidiaries, including welfare groups, as well as religious charities and front organisations of *jihadi* groups in the distribution of funds and relief goods.

Above all, *jihadi* groups have benefited from military patronage. Having served Pakistan's strategic interests in Kashmir and Afghanistan for more than two decades, they see themselves as extensions of the army. Nearly all *jihadi* NGO workers interviewed by Crisis Group claimed a close working relationship with local military commanders. Indeed, the army worked alongside the renamed *Lashkar* and *Jaish* in Kashmir.⁸⁴ An Al-Rasheed Trust organiser said that the Islamist groups had been "exemplified as the F-16s of the relief operations during meetings of the Pakistan army to report on relief work". And a senior army official admitted, "we have no written or verbal direction to stop these outfits' activities, which is why we are coordinating with them in relief work".⁸⁵

Fearing that the *jihadis* will become even more entrenched with the military's help, an HRCP official said, "the *jihadi* outfits will have enough funds to sustain their relief efforts well into the later stages of reconstruction, while some other NGOs won't have this capacity. So in the end, what will we be left with? The [*jihadi*] NGOs, of course".⁸⁶

C. Implications of the Islamist Relief Role

Aware of Western, in particular U.S., concerns about the *jihadi* presence in NWFP and Kashmir, Musharraf declared: "We have warned them that if we see any single activity of their involvement in anything other than welfare, we are not only going to ban them but we are going to get them out of that place". However, he also justified his government's inaction, saying, "but now since they are there, certainly we would not like them to stop, why should we not allow our own people who are going there and assisting those people, whether they are '*jihadis*' or anybody".⁸⁷ The military government's willingness to countenance the presence of banned terrorist and extremist organisations counters its claims that their networks have been disbanded.⁸⁸

1. Sectarianism, education, jihadi recruits

The Islamist prominence in relief activities, whether through political or *jihadi* or even more strictly religious entities, will likely fuel political and social conflict within Pakistan. Although most Islamist groups are either Deobandi and Wahabi or modernists close to the Wahabi school of thought, they compete for public support. An upsurge of sectarianism is inevitable, given their ideological/ritualistic cleavages and militancy. The reconstruction of mosques and *madrasas* of their sects, for instance, is high on their agenda but most do not have a local base. This competition could, therefore, exacerbate sectarian conflict and tensions between the groups and local communities.

More insidious is the potentially long-term impact on the socio-political landscape of the region, which has been the epicentre of the Kashmir *jihad*. Almost all state-run schools in Pakistani-administered

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Kashmir and in the five affected NWFP districts were destroyed or badly damaged. Volunteers and non-sectarian NGOs are concerned that *madrasas* will replace them. A volunteer in Bedadi village in NWFP warned, "it is easier to set up a *madrasa* rather than rebuild a school".⁸⁹ The religious parties and *jihadi* organisations also intend to construct modern Islamic schools. Said Tehseenullah Khan of the National Research and Development Foundation, an organisation focusing on *madrasa* reform in NWFP said:

I'm afraid that the *jihadi* organisations' schools will replace the destroyed education network. Through their *madrasas* and schools, they will find a way to take the people and their children into confidence. Many children are now orphans. The earthquake-hit area is a fertile field for *jihadis*. It will be easy for the Islamic NGOs to first launch a mission of protection and then to recruit them in the medium term. We feel that this is a very alarming situation. The government needs to address this issue, and education must be the top priority in the reconstruction efforts.⁹⁰

The Deobandi Wafaqul Madaris Al-Arabiya, Pakistan's largest union of *madrasas*, has established an earthquake relief fund to rebuild 1,500 mosques and 300 *madrasas* in AJK and NWFP.⁹¹ While the members of the *madrasa* union have been given a target of \$4.16 million, Al-Rasheed Trust's media organs, *Islam* and *Zarbe-Momin*, have run advertisements to raise additional funds.

Alongside the Deobandis, JI's Al-Khidmat Foundation is building modern Islamic schools and mosques, which would help spread the influence of its subsidiary, the *Hizbul Mujahideen*.⁹² In Battagram, the foundation has set up twenty tent schools, operating under the JI's student and teacher wings. Other religious organisations, such as Al-Huda Foundation and Iqra Foundation, are also focusing on the education sector, hoping to fill the vacuum created by the collapse of government schools.

Every religious organisation has announced, through mosque loudspeakers, banners and pamphlets, that it will adopt children

orphaned by the earthquake, rather than leave them at the mercy of Western NGOs. *Jihadi* groups such as the *Jamaat-ud-Dawa* (JD) also see in this opportunities to gain new recruits. The JD, for instance, runs the Maaz bin Jabal complex in Rawalpindi where it intends, if allowed, to house orphans. Said Zafar Iqbal, head of the JD's education wing, "We have a large facility in our Muridke centre and 180 schools in Punjab. Children from the affected areas will also be shifted there to continue their studies. We hope to accommodate every affected student".⁹³

Although the government has banned the adoption of orphans and intends to house them in state-run institutions, the *jihadi* groups are bringing them as well as displaced children into their camps. Farhad Burney of the Ansar Burney Welfare Trust, a leading local humanitarian organisation, said, "we have heard from very reliable sources and seen with our own eyes that orphaned and lost children are being taken by *jihadi* organisations in northern Pakistan to be trained".⁹⁴ During its family-tracing programme, aimed at reuniting lost children with their families, an international NGO faced *jihadi* opposition. When it tried to persuade camp managers to reunite a child in a JD facility in Muzaffarabad with his mother, it was initially denied access. "It took us weeks of negotiation with *Jamat-ud-Dawa* to get the child released and reunited with the mother".⁹⁵

2. *Countering extremism*

Both the Islamist political parties and their *jihadi* allies are understandably concerned about changed public perceptions of the West due to the relief work of NATO and Western NGOs. Survivors and the public at large favourably compared Western professionalism and efficiency to that of government agencies, particularly in the days following the earthquake when Pakistanis saw Western workers rescue survivors while their own military stood by. A counter-campaign by the Islamist organisations is now underway.

"We need to offset the impact that foreign NGOs are having on the minds of the people", said an Al-Rasheed Trust camp manager in

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Mansehra.⁹⁶ "We welcome the whole world to carry out relief activities. But we cannot tolerate propagation of Western values and culture under the cover of relief work. Once their work is done, they ought to leave; otherwise the possibility of conflict with the local population and political organisations will increase", warned Ehsanullah Waqas, JI's provincial parliamentarian and coordinator of Al-Khidmat's relief operations.⁹⁷

Castigating Christian relief agencies such as World Vision, a coordinator of an Al-Rasheed Trust camp in Balakot said, "their camps provide less relief and [put] stress more on schools. Every World Vision camp has a school. We welcome their relief programmes but cannot tolerate promotion of Christianity among the trauma-stricken needy people. We will go wherever this NGO opens a camp and set up our own".⁹⁸ Rejecting the criticism, World Vision Country Director Siguard Hanson said: "There is no question that we are a faith-based organisation but we do not proselytise. If the Islamists or anyone is concerned about our activities, we have nothing to hide including from the federal government, and we have complete transparency and accountability".⁹⁹

To counter particularly *jihadi* propaganda and build upon the swell of public goodwill, the UN and Western donors and humanitarian organisations should reject government guidelines if they translate into assisting Islamist organisations and choose instead to work with secular political parties, local communities and secular NGOs in identifying the most appropriate reconstruction schemes. By focusing on education, a key demand of local communities, donors could also help prevent the affected areas from turning into fertile grounds for the spread of religious extremism. The involvement of local communities in school building projects would have the additional advantage of helping rebuild shattered lives.¹⁰⁰ To prevent especially *jihadis* from exploiting the most vulnerable segments of the affected population, particularly households headed by women, donors should consider micro-credit schemes and other means of sustainable income generation. Donors and influential actors such as the U.S. and the European Union should also

urge Musharraf to end the practice of allowing banned *jihadi* organisations to operate under changed names.¹⁰¹

VI. REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS

There was a surge in terrorist activity in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), attributed by Indian authorities to *Lashkar-e-Tayyeba* and other Pakistan-based, banned *jihadi* groups, in the earthquake's wake, with 44 killed, including the J&K Education Minister, Ghulam Nabi Lone, the following fortnight. Indian forces claimed to have killed 46 militants, many in foiled attempts to cross over from Pakistan-administered Kashmir.¹⁰² *Jihadi* groups might have wanted to dispel the impression that the earthquake had damaged their organisational capacity.¹⁰³

This heightened violence, combined with the 29 October 2005 bombings, which killed 62 people in New Delhi, and the *jihadi* presence in NWFP and AJK earthquake-hit areas¹⁰⁴ adversely affected India-Pakistan relations. Although the strained atmosphere did not derail the normalisation process, Islamabad and New Delhi's failure to respond promptly and to cooperate in extending relief to Kashmiri survivors fuelled local resentment.

In J&K, Kashmiris accused the Indian army of behaving like an "an occupying force".¹⁰⁵ In AJK, Kashmiris were far more critical of the Pakistan military's response, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. Although thousands of troops were stationed in AJK, the Pakistan military tended to its own casualties and focused on shoring up defences along the LOC instead of rescuing survivors. The failure to consult local communities and the absence of a civilian disaster management infrastructure also adversely affected relief operations.

Musharraf's decision to decline an Indian offer of helicopters, which would have doubled his country's fleet for the emergency, was ill-advised as was India's initial reluctance to ease restrictions on cross-LOC movement which would have benefited remote villages on the Pakistani side that remained without aid for three weeks.¹⁰⁶ In Chakoti,

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for instance, survivors in outlying areas complained that they were "supplied by military helicopters after two weeks. The supplies are never enough. A large amount of people are wounded and haven't received any medical support".¹⁰⁷

India and Pakistan would have benefited by collaborating on humanitarian relief, thereby regaining the confidence of Kashmiris. Instead, even after they agreed to open five LOC crossings points to facilitate humanitarian relief, administrative constraints minimised their utility, including for the delivery of relief goods and reunification of divided families. India imposed constraints to prevent the misuse of the facility by *jihadis*, while Pakistan was as reluctant to open its side of the LOC to Indian humanitarian workers.

The earthquake presented the international community an opportunity, through humanitarian relief, to engage constructively in Kashmir. NATO's relief role, as noted, helped to counter anti-Western *jihadi* propaganda. In the reconstruction phase, too, Western donor nations could win Kashmiri goodwill and counter *jihadi* influence, by involving communities in decision-making and rebuilding the health and educational infrastructure. At the same time, influential international players, particularly the U.S., should persuade President Musharraf to exclude *jihadi* organisations from reconstruction and rehabilitation not just in AJK but also in the *jihadi* recruitment grounds of the earthquake-hit regions of NWFP.

VII. CONCLUSION

The task of reconstructing homes, hospitals and schools and providing livelihood for millions of survivors in NWFP and Kashmir still lies ahead. Undoing the disaster produced by the October earthquake will take three to four years. And even that timeframe depends on a well-planned and implemented reconstruction policy.

Democratic parties have challenged the authority of military-controlled relief and reconstruction bodies, demanded civilian oversight for them and expressed concerns about the military's professional

competence as well as the lack of governmental transparency and accountability. The opposition is also concerned that Musharraf intends to use the generous support of the international community to undermine already fragile civilian structures in the earthquake-hit areas and to strengthen the legitimacy of his military government internationally. These concerns are well-founded.

If the military retains its control over relief and insists on also dominating reconstruction, the entire process will be marred - from the determination of priorities to the implementation of projects. Moreover, military-controlled structures do not lend themselves to the transparency and accountability that is vital for any successful reconstruction process. Instead of strengthening civilian capacity, the military government has opted to sideline civilian administration and representative institutions. And its strategic priorities have translated into support for the relief role of Islamist organisations, including banned *jihadi* groups, helping them to strengthen their presence in NWFP and Kashmir and marginalising as a result moderate voices.

Through their close relationship with the military, the donor community, UN agencies and many INGOs have also inadvertently empowered Islamists, including *jihadis*; and by willingly working with military-controlled structures, they have lost an opportunity to ensure good governance and promote democratisation. If donor nations were to insist that local communities, civil society NGOs and national parliamentarians should shape and control the reconstruction phase, they could neutralise anti-Western agendas and help make reconstruction and rehabilitation policy meaningful. If the billions of dollars pledged for reconstruction are not to be lost, donor states, including the U.S. and the European Union, UN agencies and INGOs must persuade the Musharraf government to create an independent oversight mechanism to shape reconstruction priorities and ensure transparency in the spending of funds.

- At the national level, major donors should work through a single overarching body, supplemented by country-specific

accountability mechanisms. If a donor country is reluctant to join such an umbrella mechanism, it could participate as an observer. Common programme standards should also be followed to ensure that reconstruction priorities are cost-effective.¹⁰⁸ The body should monitor the objectives and implementation of reconstruction policy in order to ensure that vital goals such as reviving the state-run education sector, reconstructing houses and providing and restoring livelihoods are met.

- At the local and provincial levels, the participation of survivors in accountability mechanisms should be ensured through elected monitoring committees in the affected areas, assisted by officials from relevant divisions of the local and provincial civil administrations. Elected representatives on these committees should be consulted on all major decisions related to policy as well as expenditures and have access to documentation on demand. Survivors, too, should have a voice in the committees and be free to question or seek clarification. The legal and regulatory framework for such a transparency mechanism, or "people's audit", is already in place in India.¹⁰⁹
- Civil society organisations should also have a role in informing government policy, monitoring public expenditures, and implementing reconstruction and rehabilitation projects. Donors should encourage the government to create mechanisms that would allow NGOs to participate effectively.

By pressing Musharraf to end his ties with banned *jihadi* organisations and exclude them from earthquake relief and reconstruction, influential actors such as the U.S. and the European Union would also empower moderate Pakistani voices and promote regional peace. Turning a blind eye once again to Musharraf's support for the *jihadis* would serve no purpose other than further to embolden radical forces that are capitalising on years of military rule.

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4. Urging that a bipartisan parliamentary committee should supervise the relief funds, the opposition leader in the Senate (upper house of parliament), Mian Raza Rabbani of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) also stressed that "for the sake of transparency, the government should immediately announce how many accounts are being maintained and the amount of money so far deposited and spent". "Government Asked to Open Single Account for Relief Fund", *Dawn*, 19 October 2005.
5. On 7 November 2005, India and Pakistan agreed to open five LOC crossings: at Nauseri-Tithwal; Rawalakot-Poonch; Tattapani-Mendhar; Chakoti-Uri and Hajipir-Uri.
6. Crisis Group interview, Islamabad, December 2005.
7. See <http://www.un.org.pk/undp/cpr/cpr-overview.htm>.
8. Crisis Group interview, Zafar Iqbal, Islamabad, December 2005.
9. Crisis Group interview, Abbottabad, NWFP, December 2005.
10. Crisis Group interviews at the PPP relief camp in Mansehra, NWFP, December 2005.
11. The Federal Relief Commissioner, Major General Farooq Ahmed Khan, heads the organisation.
12. Crisis Group interview, Ayub Khan Tanoli, HRCP Representative in Mansehra, NWFP, December 2005.
13. Crisis Group interview, international humanitarian worker, Islamabad, December 2005.
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15. Responding to objections why the army did not use its helicopters to provide relief and airlift the victims, the retired General said, "gun-fitted helicopters could only be used in war". "Disaster Relief a Civil Job, says Minister", *Dawn*, 16 October 2005.
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18. "The army is complaining that the provincial administration has not been efficient in NWFP, while NWFP's provincial administration is complaining it doesn't have the authority or sufficient resources to meet the challenge". Crisis Group interview, UN official, Mansehra, December 2005.
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20. "Quake: Many Miles to Go: Fact-finding Mission to Earthquake Affected Areas", Fact-Finding Mission, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Lahore, December 2005, p. 25.
21. Crisis Group Asia Report N°77, *Devolution in Pakistan: Reform or Regression?*, 22 March 2004, p. 2.
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26. General Zubair was appointed head of the Infrastructure Monitoring Unit of the Planning Commission and will, therefore, control the most crucial aspect of reconstruction, rebuilding the infrastructure of the earthquake hit areas.
27. "Quake: Many Miles to Go", op. cit., p. 9.
28. Pakistan stood 144 out of 158 countries in Transparency International's 2005 "Corruption Perceptions Index", available at: http://www.transparency.org/policy_and_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2005.
29. Farzana Sheikh, "Peace Amid the Ruins", *The World Today*, December 2005.
30. Ahmed Rashid, "Pakistan Earthquake Revives Civic Power", BBC News, 16 November 2005.
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32. Previous audits of the military's activities by the Auditor General had little impact on military mismanagement. For instance, the special 1999 audit report on Okara military farms identified nine cases of mismanagement involving \$3.9 billion and recommended further investigations. The process was immediately stopped.

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33. ERRA's charter is available at www.reliefweb.int.
34. "Transparency in Compensation Process Sought", *Dawn*, 10 November 2005.
35. Crisis Group interview, Ayub Khan Tanoli, HRCP representative, Mansehra, December 2005.
36. JKLF supporters also complained of harassment by the military in Kashmir's Rawalakot district. "Quake: Many Miles to Go", op. cit., p. 26.
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41. Amir, op.cit., p.82.
42. Ibid.
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48. The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank centred their approach to reconstruction on six governance pillars: 1. People-centred solutions, highlighting, among other issues, a clear strategy for transition from military-led relief to civilian-administered recovery. 2. Restoration of

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responsibility to legally mandated institutions, including the need to return executive functions to the lowest level of mandated competent authority. 3. District and central strategic coordination and accountability, including accountability for assigning responsibilities at the national and provincial levels. 4. Competing demands to be managed through technical and policy choices. 5. Enhancement of local capacity as well as operational capacity in responding to planning, budgeting and implementation needs. 6. Accountability and enforcement of standards and norms, including zero tolerance by donors, government, and civil society of corruption, backed by extension of the Auditor General's jurisdiction to all relevant agencies.

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68. *Harakatul Mujahideen* is on the UN Security Council's list of sanctioned organisations.

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DOCUMENTS

PLEDGES FOR RELIEF, RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION IN PAKISTAN

Up to 23-11-2005 (US \$ Million)

S.N.	Country/Organization	Total	Loan	Grant
1.	World Bank	1070.000	1065.000	5.000
2.	Asian Development Bank	1000.000	920.000	80.000
3.	Saudi Arabia	573.000	320.000	253.000
4.	USA	510.000		510.000
5.	Islamic Development Bank	501.000	500.000	1.600
6.	IMF	375.000	375.000	
7.	China	326.200	300.000	26.200
8.	Iran	200.100	200.000	0.100
9.	UK	178.640		178.640
10.	Turkey	150.000		150.000
11.	Japan	120.000	100.000	20.000
12.	European Commission	110.000		110.000
13.	France	103.000	94.000	9.000
14.	UAE	100.000		100.000
15.	Kuwait	100.000	50.000	50.000
16.	Germany	82.000		82.000
17.	Canada	71.000		71.000
18.	Norway	70.000		70.000
19.	Netherland	70.000		70.000
20.	World Food Programme	62.750		62.750
21.	Australia	62.380		62.380
22.	Switzerland	61.000		61.000
23.	IFAD	60.000	60.000	
24.	Agha Khan Foundation	53.500		53.500
25.	Sweden	45.000		45.000
26.	India	25.000		25.000
27.	Finland	22.000		22.000
28.	Denmark	18.500		18.500
29.	Italy	12.240		12.240
30.	Ireland	6.000		6.000

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S.N.	Country/Organization	Total	Loan	Grant
31.	Oman	5.000		5.000
32.	Bahrain	5.000		5.000
33.	Belgium	5.000		5.000
34.	Malaysia	4.300		4.000
35.	Pak-Turk Foundation	4.000		4.000
36.	South Korea	3.000		3.000
37.	Ukraine	3.000		3.000
38.	Greece	2.800		2.800
39.	Luxemberg	2.600		2.600
40.	Austria	2.350		2.350
41.	Bangladesh	2.000		2.000
42.	Azerbaijan	1.500		1.500
43.	Morocco	1.500		1.500
44.	Indonesia	1.000		1.000
45.	Afghanistan	1.000		1.000
46.	Algeria	1.000		1.000
47.	Singapore	0.600		0.600
48.	Brunei	0.590		0.590
49.	New Zealand	0.520		0.520
50.	Thailand	0.400		0.400
51.	Czech Republic	0.400		0.400
52.	Mexico	0.300		0.300
53.	Bhutan	0.100		0.100
54.	Other Countries	2.000		2.000
55.	Other Multilaterals	1.250	3984.000	1.250
	Total Pledges	6189.820	3984.000	2206.420

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JKCHR — Jammu and Kashmir Council for Human Rights

NGO in Special Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
Established in 1984

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23 October 2005

Honourable Chief Justice
Supreme Court
Azad Jammu and Kashmir
Muzaffarabad
Azad Kashmir

Honourable Chief Justice

As a concerned State Subject I share your grief on the loss of life of members of Bar and Bench in the earthquake and the loss of a human habitat on either side of LOC in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

On the one hand we have a long distance to walk and many seasons to roll over to let the grief relax its grip and on the other the superior judiciary has a specific duty to perform in the plural interests of a people distributed under three administrations and under the influence of five governments.

I am making these submission when a four-member bench of the Supreme Court, of Pakistan headed by Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, on Friday 21 October 2005 ordered Capital Development Authority (CDA) to arrange accommodation for 140 families of Margalla Tower that collapsed in 8 October earthquake. The court also ordered the CDA to provide accommodation temporarily to the displaced families by hiring residences of equal status as they were occupying in Margalla Tower.

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Notices were issued to all the respondents, including CDA through its chairman, Chaudhry Construction Company (CCC) Associates, architects, engineers and developers, Ginza Centre, Muhammad Ramzan Khokar, Managing Director, CCC Associates, and others for appearing before the apex court on 28 October.

I inscribe my interest in the welfare of the affectees and make this submission at a time when on 21 October 2005 Jean Ziegler the UN Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur on the right to food submitted his report to the General Assembly and has concluded that, “The right to food should be respected in economic adjustment and trade liberalization policies prescribed by international organizations, which have an obligation to ensure that poor communities are not left in even greater poverty and hunger.” The report says that “Such international bodies as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) “should recognize that they have binding responsibilities towards human rights, including the right to food” and that “With power must come responsibility.”

“The Special Rapporteur is concerned that projects financed by international organizations such as the World Bank can have a negative impact on the right to food of vulnerable populations, sometimes causing them to be displaced from their land and to lose access to their traditional lands and livelihoods.”

I respectfully believe that the wisdom of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and of the report of UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food needs to be harnessed in the plural welfare of the people of Jammu and Kashmir who lost a generation on the Indian side in the last 15 years and on the Pakistani side in just one ‘earth-shake’.

Traces of pro-active human involvement and negligence of duty, although in varying degrees, could be found in either situation and as such cause a criminal liability.

India in its bilateral agreement of 26 October 1947, of course disputed, has taken upon to protect life, honour and property of the

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people of Jammu and Kashmir, inclusive of all the territories as on 15 August 1947 when Pakistan too entered into a bilateral agreement with the Government of the Maharaja of Kashmir.

Although the people of Jammu and Kashmir have no such bilateral agreement with the Government of Pakistan yet the latter has 'assumed responsibilities in Azad Kashmir under UNCIP resolutions', and has a duty to perform in accordance with the wisdom envisaged in article 257 of the Constitution of Pakistan.

The jurisprudence of responsibilities under UNCIP resolutions too is inclusive and extends to all administrations of Jammu and Kashmir. It may be pointed out that the Government of Pakistan has double stepped on the question of its responsibilities under UNCIP resolutions in regard to Gilgit and Baltistan.

Its decision to take over the administration in Northern Areas under Karachi Agreement of April 1949 is repugnant to its claim in respect of UNCIP duties and is also without any reference to the people and leadership of the area. Moreover the constitutional restraints under Section 4(7)(2) of the Act 1974 are a violation of a 'free transfer of opinion' and a breach of UNCIP resolutions as well.

I would like to invite your attention to the jurisprudence of the title to 128 year old Rights Movement of the people of Jammu and Kashmir and the 58 year old respective claims of India and Pakistan.

India and Pakistan as a consequence accrue a joint criminal liability for any kind of loss to life, honour and property. The earthquake of 8 October 2005 has brought home the reality that Azad Kashmir still lives in primitive days of 1846. We have no link roads, no link helipads, no medical facilities and no telecommunication facilities that could serve and endure situations like 8 October 2005.

Pakistan has taken upon a responsibility under UNCIP resolutions and the ceiling of this responsibility became even higher when Prime Minister of Pakistan and his six nominations decided to secure a share in the AJ & K Council. Pakistan has made use of our natural resources

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and continues to play hot and cold with the Government of India to continue its embedded interests in the waters of Kashmir. The transfer of benefit to the people in Azad Kashmir or in other administrations has not remained proportionate to the use of this natural resource.

It is unfortunate that the Government of Pakistan wound up the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Red Crescent Society (Red Cross), a body which specialises in 'Disaster Preparedness' and can go universal in its appeal in the event of a natural disaster or a war through the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies headquartered in Geneva.

Unfortunately the establishment has failed in her vain efforts to shade the Azad Kashmir from international view. Although the establishment in Islamabad made every effort to restrain the international agencies focused on one building – the Margalla Tower in Islamabad yet it could not hide the tragedy that was unfolding in our home land in Azad Kashmir.

Our people are still under the rubble, dead and alive, and they are still unaccessed in many villages in the remote areas of Azad Kashmir. They could have been saved if we had small link roads, link helipads, local medical facilities and durable telecommunication system.

The initial announcement of the Government of Pakistan that the situation in Azad Kashmir was under control entails a criminal liability. While as UN emergency relief coordinator, Under-Secretary General Jan Egeland told reporters in Geneva on 20 October that "The United Nations is facing its worst logistical nightmare ever as it scrambles to save the lives of tens of thousands of earthquake survivors in inaccessible areas of Pakistan in an unprecedented race against time that dwarfs efforts after last year's Indian Ocean Tsunami." He has called "for emergency relief effort equivalent of the Berlin airlift that kept Berlin alive in the late 1940s after Soviet forces cut all land access."

He said, "If they could do that in the end of the 1940s, set up in no time a lifeline to millions, we should be able to do that in 2005," he added of the need to rush in hundreds of thousands of winterized tents, medicine, and food and other urgently needed supplies before the

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situation worsened even further with the arrival of the harsh Himalayan winter.”


Unfortunately AJ & K administration has emerged as corrupt and anaesthetised. Our Prime Minister is sitting put in a ‘tent’ and has no role in crisis management. It could be easily said that he is a Prime Minister of Pakistani establishment, for Pakistani establishment and run by the Pakistani establishment. The earthquake has shown that Azad Kashmir still lives in the Dogra days of 1846. The area, however, has been exposed to the notice of international camera.

Pakistan should not have declined the Indian offer of helicopters or humanitarian aid to access parts of Kashmir which are on the side of Pakistan. Indian military, in particular its medical and humanitarian segments, could have entered the disaster stricken areas more quickly and with better results. Indian army is already in Kashmir and Pakistan has continued to concede to this fact through its bilateral agreement of Tashkent and Shimla and in other agreements at the UN. Indian and Pakistan army medical and relief teams could very easily be commanded by UNMOGIP Chief Major-General Guido Palmieri of Italy.

I submit that it is a natural disaster but it has human error and human negligence embedded in it. I respectfully request your honour to treat this communication as a complaint in ‘public interest’ and take cognizance of the failings of the two administrations identified in the Constitution Act 1974 of Azad Kashmir and secure to the people of Jammu and Kashmir a ‘duty to fairness’ of the two administrations.

I wish to point out that these are my preliminary submissions and I would be dilating them in due course.

Respectfully Yours



Dr. Syed Nazir Gilani
Secretary General- JKCHR
Advocate Supreme Court

EARTHQUAKE AND GAME PLAN OF MILITARY JUNTA

Shabir Choudhry

No doubt it was a natural disaster, but it was made worse by those who rule us and control us, and often claim to have monopoly over wisdom and loyalty in that part of the world.

One wonders why the army and other government agencies failed to reach out to the suffering people? Why Pakistan government refused to accept help from India when it could have helped to save thousands of lives? Is the government trying to cover up something? What happened to *Mujahideen* training camps and where are those *Mujahideen*?

I spoke to one of my contacts in Bagh today (13 October 2005) at 3 pm British time (7 pm in Azad Kashmir and Pakistan), and he said that to date he has not seen any Government or any other help in his area. He was furious, and he had every right to be. Twenty members of his family perished in this tragedy. His parents and other members of the family were injured and lying in open fields with no help and no food.

When I talked to him he was on his way back to Bagh from Rawalpindi where he went to buy tents, medicine and white cloth (*Kafan*) for burial. His anger was fuelled by his failure to get any tents and clothes because there were none available in Rawalpindi. He said 'Shabir Sahib, please send us some tents, it is raining here and my family and thousands of other people are out in fields without any shelter.'

There are many who immediately come to defend the government and say that roads are blocked and that scale of the disaster is so great that both the governments could not cope with it. This is not true. This man travelled from Bagh to Rawlapindi on road to buy necessary items, and he had no helicopter to take him (many helicopters are still busy

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on duty in Waziristan and taking VIPs from one place to another that they can have photo sessions while giving out help).

Point to be noted here is that this conversation took place on Thursday (13 October 2005), and that is six days after the earthquake; and a military government which makes lofty claims and has a large army and two third of Pakistan's budget at its disposal cannot even reach out to the suffering people six days after the event.

A prominent Pakistani columnist, Imtiaz Alam, while criticising the government said, "A state that failed to mobilize its over-pampered machinery to rescue its citizens in their time of distress is not, perhaps capable to even estimate the depth and breath of the destruction." He further said that state authorities are more "attuned to killing, not rescuing."

I disagree with all those who say that the governments of Azad Kashmir and Pakistan were not fully aware of the tragedy. Azad Kashmir is in total control of Pakistan army since 1947, and they know every village and hill top in that area. It is wrong to assume that they didn't know which areas were affected. Pakistan has a large army presence in all parts of Azad Kashmir, and though their own network was affected but it was operational. Did they not inform the government or their superiors in Islamabad what had happened?

I prove this point with an example. My distant cousin died in this tragedy and his dead body was brought to his village in Bhimber on the second day of the incident by the army. Those who brought the body were polite and helpful, they dug grave themselves and within hours left by saying that they have to take more bodies to other places.

The army men were able to find dead body of this man, locate his village and brought his body to his parents. This special treatment was given to him because he was an army man himself, otherwise there were thousands of other dead bodies lying about and children trapped under rubble crying for help; but they were left there to face slow and painful death.

EARTHQUAKE AND GAME PLAN OF MILITARY JUNTA

One wonders why such a big army, full of resources could not reach out to save lives, and why the Indian offer of help was refused which could have saved hundreds of lives; and could also have boosted confidence between both governments. Answer to this is simple if we take the existence of militant camps into consideration.

Despite all the claims of dismantling *Mujahideen* training camps, open secret was that they were fully operational, and had more than three thousand militants from various nationalities. These camps were located in various places in Azad Kashmir and in areas of Balakot and Mansehra.

Unlike what happens in this part of the world the natural tragedy when it struck, didn't distinguish between a man with gun and a civilian. They, like other civilians, were either killed, injured or were under the rubble.

A well - placed source told me that the government could not have allowed any foreign aid agency or camera crew to venture into those areas because of fear that they might see these *Mujahideen* either dead or alive or even their bodies emerging out of rubbles. What explanation could the government give if some *Mujahideen* from Bangladesh, Sudan, Algeria and Egypt are seen? This could have been very embarrassing for the military government of General Musharaf who on more than one occasion claimed that there were no camps.

Authorities needed time to 'clear and control' the situation, so hurriedly a strategy was made to keep the media people away from these areas, and for two and half days a focus of attention for media and the entire world was the Margalla Tower. No disrespect to those who lost their lives and suffered under the rubble of Margalla Tower, Pakistani government made it appear as if 'Twin Towers' have fallen, or Minar-e-Pakistan or Tomb of Mohammed Ali Jinnah has fallen. This loss, sad as it is, is very small when compared to the loss of more than fifty thousand lives in Azad Kashmir.

In view of the above scenario one can understand why the government refused to accept Indian help. They could not have allowed

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Indian helicopters to cross the LOC even to drop humanitarian aid, just in case they see these *Mujahideen* or dismantled camps. And those who claim that the government didn't want the Indian military men to see what defence arrangements were there in Azad Kashmir, and that is why they refused to allow them; and that it was done with national interest in mind are totally wrong. Who will believe that in 21st century with satellite above our sky and with AWCS planes at India's disposal they didn't know what was there in Azad Kashmir.

That aside what has hurt us Kashmiris is the news that Indian military men were allowed to cross the LOC to help and save lives of Pakistani soldiers who were trapped because of the quake; but they were not allowed to cross the LOC with medicines, blankets and tents which could have saved lives of hundreds of suffering Kashmiris.

According to reports, Indian army could see innocent civilians trapped and crying out for help, and it was easy for them to reach out to these people from the Indian side of the LOC, but the government of Pakistan and its military apparatus had other priorities. A life of a Kashmiri has little value to our occupiers.

A cyclone in East Pakistan in 1970, and the response of Pakistan's military government of the time, made people of the then East Pakistan realise that rulers in Islamabad had very little love and affection for them, and that expedited the separation of East Pakistan. The present tragedy has also opened eyes of Kashmiris, and it has brought our most cherished independence a step nearer, albeit at a very heavy cost.

But I salute ordinary people of Pakistan who cry out on our suffering and have gone out of way to help suffering people in Azad Kashmir and Pakistan. I cannot forget words of Dr Shahid Masood, presenter of Views and News on ARY digital and Dr Aamir Liaquat Hussain, presenter of *Aalim* online on Geo TV.

13 October 2005

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